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Abstract 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 is considered one of the worst failures 
since the Great Depression (1929-33). Experts around the globe have debated the 
various triggers of the GFC that include (but are not limited to) free markets, 
financial complexity, credit control, and corporate governance practices. However, 
inefficient risk management practices are considered as one of the major causes that 
led to the subprime meltdown and global recession. In reaction to enormous losses 
and in order to stem contagion effects, regulators (particularly in developed 
countries) recommended that companies adhere to sophisticated risk management 
practices. In the UK, this prompted the issuance of the Walker Report in 2009 and a 
series of updated guidelines from the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) that in 
particular recommended that listed companies invest in risk management governance 
and practices. 
As a result of these recommendations, a growing number of FTSE-350 
companies listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) now adhere to such 
recommendations in the form of enterprise risk management (ERM) adoption and 
formation of board-level risk committees to enhance their risk oversight function. In 
this light, the purpose of this study is twofold. First, to examine the impact of ERM 
on firm performance. Second, it seeks to investigate whether this relationship is 
strengthened or weakened by the structure and composition of the risk committee. To 
fulfil this purpose, this study collects data from FTSE-350 companies listed in LSE 
that have implemented ERM processes and established board-level risk committees 
from 2012 to 2015. The data is collected from annual reports and the DataStream 
database, and the final sample consists of 260 firm-year observations. Regression 
analysis is used to investigate the relationships.   
The results show that ERM significantly and positively affects firm 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Moreover, the presence of financial experts 
and female members in risk committees provide a strong positive influence on the 
ERM-performance relationship. In contrast, this relationship is significantly 
weakened by risk committee size, number of meetings, and independence. The 
results are robust to alternative specifications. The findings of this study suggest that 
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the diversity of the risk committee members in terms of financial expertise and 
gender is found to complement ERM function. However, ERM is adversely affected 
by the weak monitoring role of the risk committee. In other words, the concept of a 
board-level risk committee is not a panacea for ERM oversight. The results of this 
study suggest that the implementation of an effective ERM fulfils the objectives of 
the firm and shareholders but it is necessary for the corporate regulatory bodies in the 
UK to issue clear guidelines for risk committees in terms of their structure and 
composition to promote efficient risk monitoring. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Overview 
This chapter provides the background and purpose of this study. Section 1.2 debates 
the importance of enterprise risk management (ERM)1 and discusses how risk 
committees2 emerged after the frequent corporate collapses during the early 2000s 
and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007 – 2009. Accordingly, this section 
discusses the study’s purpose and articulates the research objectives. Section 1.3 
highlights the adoption of ERM in UK companies, followed by Section 1.4 that 
provides a discussion on how the risk oversight function is shifting from audit 
committees to newly emerging board-level risk committees in the UK in order to 
support ERM activities. Section 1.5 discusses motivation for this research. Section 
1.6 elaborates on the contributions of this study, which are mainly related to 
emerging research in the risk governance literature. Finally, the chapter provides a 
short summary of the subsequent chapters of this study in Section 1.7.           
 
1.2. Background and Purpose 
The last two decades have witnessed increased regulatory efforts to enhance risk 
management governance, especially in developed countries. In the early 2000s, a 
series of large corporate downfalls (during 2000 to 2003) including Enron and 
WorldCom in the United States (US), and Equitable Life Assurance Society in 
                                                 
 
1 Enterprise risk management (ERM) is synonymous with enterprise-wide risk management, strategic 
risk management, consolidated risk management, holistic risk management, and integrated risk 
management. For more information see Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011).  
2 In this study, the “risk committee” is defined either as both a combined audit and risk committee 
(ARC) or a standalone risk committee (SRC). Chapter 5, Section 5.3 discusses the conceptualization 
of the adoption of the risk committee concept.  
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United Kingdom (UK), shook investors’ confidence and heightened their concerns 
about overall risk management practices. This widespread unrest among investors 
forced regulators and professional bodies around the world to re-think risk 
governance mechanisms in the shape of improved guidelines for internal controls and 
risk management to restore investors trust (Fichtner, 2010). In the wake of such 
outrage, new corporate governance codes were issued globally, including the 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in the US in 2002 and the UK’s combined code on 
corporate governance in 2003. Moreover, the Committee of Sponsoring Organization 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO) developed a detailed enterprise risk 
management (ERM)3 framework in 2004. The COSO (2004) ERM framework 
expanded the concepts of risk management to a broader level and provides a holistic 
approach of quantifying, understanding, and managing risks.4 However, the COSO’s 
(2004) ERM framework was not widely adopted by UK FTSE-350 companies until 
2008.5 The adoption of this ERM framework by UK firms is discussed in the 
following section.   
The lessons learned from the corporate collapses in the early 2000s and the 
introduction of regulations on risk governance methods were not sufficient to prevent 
the global financial crisis (GFC) that began in late 2007. In this regard, Dionne 
(2013) highlights that it was not necessarily the inefficiency of rules and regulations 
on risk management but rather their lack of application and enforcement. Dionne 
(2013) suggests that, perhaps it is not uncommon that managers in different markets 
                                                 
 
3 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2 for a comprehensive definition of ERM provided by COSO (2004).  
4 Before the issuance of these guidelines, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales 
(ICAEW) in its guidance for implementing the “Turnbull Report” for listed companies in the UK, 
highlighted the adoption of enterprise-level risk governance which not only covers the management of 
financial risks but also include other risk categories relating to business strategy, operations, and 
compliance (ICAEW, 1999). However, the term “ERM” and its detailed structure and contents were 
proposed by COSO (2004).  
5 Risk management, April, 1 2009, “The New DNA: Examining the Building Blocks of Risk.”   
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routinely skirt regulations.6 Moreover, prior to the GFC, it was presumed that 
organizations had the ability to manage their risks, because if they are unable to do 
so it will negatively affect their performance and be detrimental to shareholders’ 
wealth. Based on this view, Alford (2010) describes that regulators in the UK took a 
laissez-fair approach of overseeing risk management undertaken by boards. 
Consequently, as a result of the GFC, the relaxed regulation approach has been 
questioned in the UK and internationally. The former chairman of the Federal 
Reserve stated: “I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of 
organizations, specifically banks and others, were such as they were best capable of 
protecting their own shareholders and equity in the firms” (Barwell, 2013, p. 13). 
The GFC resulted in the largest and sharpest decrease in economic activity around 
the world. In the UK, effects of the GFC were devastating, resulting in economic 
recession, corporate bankruptcies, and lower firm performance and returns to 
investors due to extreme volatility in currency, commodity, and equity markets 
(Branson, 2010).       
In the aftermath of the GFC, risk management practices gained attention via 
the adoption of ERM processes by companies and the issuance of improved 
endorsements for risk governance by regulators (Pagach and Warr, 2011; Hoyt and 
Liebenberg, 2011). Further, to support ERM processes7, various recommendations 
were issued, including a recommendation that listed companies form board-level risk 
                                                 
 
6 In a 2008 survey of risk management professionals (including internal auditor (IA), chief financial 
officer (CFO), and chief risk officer (CFO)) in US-based organizations, it was found that more than 
60% of respondents identified inefficient or careless risk management practices, 59% criticized the 
complexity of financial instruments, 57% blamed speculation, more than 70% of the respondents 
showed concerns about their own organization’s risk management system and report immature 
adoption of ERM (Beasley, Branson and Hancock, 2010).  
7 COSO (2004) defines ERM as a process that recognizes: potential risk events of the company, 
management of risks within the company’s risk appetite and tolerance levels, and provides reasonable 
assurance on the achievement of organizational objectives.      
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committees, especially in financial sector companies8. For instance, in the UK, 
Walker’s (2009) report focused on the stability of risk governance and highly 
recommended the formation of risk committees by FTSE-100 listed banks and other 
financial institutions (BOFIs) to oversee and advise the board of directors on the 
overall ERM function of the organisation.9 Moreover, the issuance of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) in the US mandated 
the establishment of risk committees in listed bank holding companies with total 
consolidated assets of more than $ 10 billion (USD). The prime responsibility of 
these risk committees is to oversee and complement the practices of ERM.  
As a result of the GFC, scholars have investigated the performance10 
implications of the adoption of ERM (Gordon, Loeb and Tseng, 2009; Pagach and 
Warr, 2010; Lin, Wen and Yu, 2012; Baxter et al., 2013; Farrell and Gallagher, 
2015) and the outcomes attached with the establishment of board-level risk 
                                                 
 
8 Companies in the financial sector around the world were highly affected by the GFC due to multiple 
factors, but most importantly aggressive risk taking (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). Therefore, the 
post-GFC “risk governance” regulations highly focused on this sector; however, the regulations also 
encouraged companies in other sectors to adopt sophisticated risk management practices. 
9 The concepts of ERM and the risk committee should not be confused together. As per the UK 
Institute of Internal Auditors, ERM is a structured, consistent, and dynamic organizational-wide 
approach to identify, access, and make decisions on potential events and reporting on opportunities 
and threats to the business that affect the achievement of its strategic objectives (IIA, 2004). 
Moreover, the concept of the “risk committee” in this study is considered as a board-level committee 
that is responsible for overseeing the functions of ERM processes and making recommendations to the 
board on its effectiveness. The distinctions and similarities between ERM and the risk committee are 
further discussed in Sections: 2.2, 2.4, 4.7, and 4.8.        
10 From a broader perspective, financial performance of an organization refers to the degree of the 
achievement of its strategic objectives, which is also an important aspect of risk management 
(Bertonèche and Knight, 2001). It involves the process of measuring the outcomes of a company’s 
policies and operations in monetary terms. The performance indicators reflect the financial health of a 
company that can be analyzed in time series or cross-sectional series with similar companies across 
the industry or sector. Several related parties are usually affected by the organization’s financial 
performance, however more commonly the key performance indicators are used and analyzed by the 
lenders, investors, and company’s management itself (Ross et al., 2013). The lenders are mainly 
interested in analyzing the ability of a firm to generate cashflows. The investors are interested in 
assessing present and expected future earnings as well as its consistency. Finally, the management of a 
company evaluates financial performance to capture opportunities relative to a company’s financial 
position, to examine the effectiveness of internal controls and risk management processes, to beat the 
competition in the marketplace, and to make decisions that are necessary for business survival. This 
study focuses on market value performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The rationale behind selection of 
this measure is comprehensively discussed in Section 5.4.1. 
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committees (Ng, Chong and Ismail, 2013; Tao and Hutchinson, 2013; Hines and 
Peters, 2015; Wu et al., 2016). However, prior research delivers mixed evidence 
based on various jurisdictions and research settings. This study adds to the risk 
governance literature in two ways. First, it extends the prior research relating to the 
impact of ERM on firm performance by providing evidence from UK-based 
companies. Secondly, as the formation of risk committees are increasingly common 
in order to oversee the practices of ERM in the listed companies (COSO, 2004; 
Brancato et al., 2006; Baxter et al., 2013), this study investigates whether risk 
committee characteristics (structure and composition) strengthen or weaken the 
impact of ERM on firm performance. Based on the above discussion, this study has 
the following objectives: 
i. To investigate the impact of ERM on firm performance in the UK. 
ii. To investigate the moderating effects of risk committee characteristics on the 
relationship between ERM and firm performance in the UK.  
 
1.3. Adoption of ERM by FTSE-350 Companies in the UK 
The evolution of risk management is indirectly stimulated by its failures (Mikes, 
2011). As discussed in Section 1.2, the last two decades have sparked considerable 
interest in risk management practices to regain investor confidence. Particularly, the 
drastic event of the GFC has raised questions the link between financial performance 
and risk management practices. In the aftermath of the crisis, organizations have 
started to transform their existing / traditional practices of risk management into a 
more efficient and strategic approach (Ray and McAuliffe, 2010). The driving factors 
of risk management evolution involve changes in economic environment, 
technological advancements, geopolitical threats, and regulatory interventions that 
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have pushed organizations to invest in ERM adoption (Bates, 2010). Figure 1.1 
displays the adoption of ERM by FTSE-350 listed companies in the UK.11 It shows 
that until the end of the GFC (in 2009), there were only 26 companies using ERM, 
but after this period the total number increased to 42 by the end of the year 2010. The 
post-GFC period shows a gradual increase in the number of companies implementing 
ERM practices and the highest change is observed during 2014 to 2015, which shows 
that 39 new companies adopted ERM. Based on this trend as depicted in Figure 1.1, 
it can be expected that ERM adoption will continue to increase in the future.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Adoption of ERM by FTSE-350 Listed Companies in the UK 
 
Figure 1.2 depicts the industry distribution of the adoption of ERM.12 The pie 
chart shows that during the years 2007 to 2015, 47 percent of the total ERM adopters 
are from the financial industry. This may be due to serious deficiencies in prudential 
oversight and financial regulation in this industry before the GFC that led to major 
governance failures and aggressive risk taking by the banks and other financial 
                                                 
 
11 The data for Figure 1.1 on utilizing ERM is collected from the annual reports for all the FTSE-350 
companies in financial and non-financial sectors. The method of the determination of ERM is further 
explained in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1.    































Source: Data from this study
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institutions. In response, various regulatory and professional guidelines were issued, 
such as the Walker (2009) report that urged financial companies to invest in 
sophisticated risk governance mechanisms such as the adoption of an independent 
ERM function. Moreover, the chart shows that after the financial industry, ERM is 
next largest in consumer goods and industrial businesses. It is interesting to note that 
the telecommunication sector represents the lowest number of ERM users.  
 
 
Figure 1.2. Industry Distribution of ERM Adoption during 2007-15 by FTSE-350 
Companies in the UK 
 
1.4. Adoption of Risk Committees by FTSE-350 Companies in the UK13 
According to the Financial Reporting Council (2010), a board of directors has 
ultimate responsibility for the overall risk management of an organization. However, 
in exercising risk oversight a board can delegate this function to a board-level 
committee and continue its monitoring role by establishing the right “tone at the top” 
                                                 
 

















Source: Data from this study 
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to ensure that the overall risk management function of the company is matched with 
business strategy and operating decisions.  
During the early 2000s, accounting and corporate governance problems and 
the subsequent collapse of big corporations resulted in increased audit committee 
regulations around the world. In the UK, the response to these issues was the 
emergence of Smith (2003) and Higgs (2003) reviews which consequently 
contributed to the combined code on corporate governance (FRC, 2003). The Smith 
(2003) report provided comprehensive guidance for audit committees via regulations 
including the risk oversight function. The report suggested that an audit committee is 
responsible for reviewing the effectiveness of a company’s risk management system 
that includes (but is not limited to) determining, monitoring, and assessing key risk 
areas. Thus, the delegation of the risk oversight function to audit committees became 
the norm and was widely exercised by the boards not only in UK companies but 
internationally. 
However, the recent GFC and subsequent collapses due to inefficient risk 
management practices (Kashyap, 2010), cast doubt on the effectiveness of audit 
committees in overseeing the risk management processes of companies (Bates and 
Leclerc, 2009). Zaman (2001) discusses on the purported multiple roles of audit 
committees and states that it is not reasonable to charge an audit committee with 
conducting high-level reviews on internal controls and risk management because the 
committee members may lack the necessary skills especially in terms of expertise 
and time. In the aftermath of the GFC, a number of recommendations by regulatory 
and professional bodies indicated the need for establishment of board-level risk 
committees, such as the Walker (2009) report in the UK. In response, companies in 
both financial and non-financial sectors began to adopt the risk committee concept 
 Chapter 1: Introduction 9 
by forming a standalone risk committee (SRC) or changing the terms of reference of 
the existing audit committee by placing a greater emphasis on the risk oversight 
function and upgrading the audit committee into a combined audit and risk 
committee (ARC).14 Figure 1.3 shows the formation of risk committees in the form 
of both ARC and SRC in FTSE-350 listed companies in the UK from the start of the 
GFC.15 It shows that during the crisis period (2007-2009) companies did not start to 
establish risk committees. The number of FTSE-350 companies in the UK with a risk 
committee by the end of the GFC in 2009 was only 20 (9 ARCs and 21 SRCs) which 
rose to 31 (10 ARCs and 21 SRCs) in 2010 after the GFC and subsequent issuance of 
the Walker (2009) report. After 2010, there appears to have been a continuous 
adoption of both ARCs and SRCs, however the year 2015 shows the highest number 
of committee formations resulting in a total 105 companies with a risk committee 
compared to 72 companies in 2014. Based on this trend it is expected that growth in 
the adoption of the risk committee will continue to increase in the future. 
                                                 
 
14 Like the SRC, the ARC is also responsible for overseeing the ERM function such as risk appetite, 
and risk tolerance, and reviewing the activities of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO). This is further 
explained in Sections 2.5, 2.6, and 5.3 of this study.  
15 The data for Figure 1.3 on the presence of risk committees is collected from the annual reports of all 
the FTSE-350 companies in financial and non-financial sectors. 
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Figure 1.3. Adoption of Risk Committees by FTSE-350 Companies in the UK 
Figure 1.4 depicts the industry distribution of risk committee adoption  
 
It shows that financial businesses have greater propensity to establish a 
board-level risk committee, with the highest percentage of adopting an SRC. There 
are several possible reasons for its emergence in this industry. First, the Walker 
(2009) report emphasized the formation of a SRC that is separate from the audit 
committee.16 Second, the FRC (2014) highlighted that audit committees of financial 
companies should review the processes of risk management in a general manner 
because the mechanism of managing and accessing risks in financial companies 
differs from other businesses. Moreover, Figure 1.4 shows that after the financial 
industry, companies in the consumer goods and industrial sectors are the next to 
embrace the adoption of the risk committee concept.            
                                                 
 
16 Sir David Walker in his report emphasized the lack of prudential oversight and weaknesses in risk 
governance of financial businesses. Recommendation 23 of the report strongly advised the boards of 
financial companies to establish a SRC that is responsible for risk oversight and to put 
recommendations to the board on various risk areas (Walker, 2009). Further information on the role 
and responsibilities of the risk committee and its link with ERM is provided in Sections 2.4, 4.7, and 
4.8.    
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Figure 1.4. Industry Distribution of the Risk Committee Adoption during 2007-15 by 
FTSE-350 Companies in the UK 
 
1.5. Research Motivations 
The study is primarily motivated by the paucity of research on the topic of ERM and 
its relationship with firm performance. While prior research has examined this 
relationship, almost all of these studies were conducted in US settings. There is very 
little evidence of the ERM and firm performance relationship in the UK to date. This 
study will contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence from listed 
companies on the London stock exchange (LSE). A further key motivation is the 
increasing concerns over the governance structure of ERM oversight, especially in 
the aftermath of the GFC (Brown, Steen and Foreman, 2009).17 In this light, the 
literature suggests that a risk committee generally assists a board of directors in 
carrying out its ERM responsibilities such as risk oversight, fostering risk culture, 
                                                 
 
17 While there are guidelines available those outline the process of ERM such as COSO (2004) and 
Standards Australia and New Zealand, Risk Management Standard AS/NZS 4360:2004. These 
guidelines are independent of industry or economic sectors and do not indicate the governance 



















Source: Data from this study
 12 Chapter 1: Introduction 
and improving the quality of risk monitoring and reporting (COSO, 2004; Brown et 
al., 2009; Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012). However, to date the research regarding 
the outcomes of risk committee structure and composition is scarce. This study is 
therefore motivated to examine whether risk committee characteristics strengthen or 
weaken the ERM and firm performance relationship. Gordon, Loeb and Tseng 
(2009) propose that ERM-driven firm performance impacts are dependent upon the 
proper match between monitoring by the board of directors18 and the ERM system. 
Their tests revealed that monitoring by the board of directors is negatively associated 
with ERM effectiveness. The current study extends the findings of Gordon et al. 
(2009) in two dimensions. First, this study considers whether the responsibility of 
ERM oversight is delegated to the risk committee by the full board. Secondly, the 
study examines several risk committee variables related to the risk committee’s 
structure and composition that could affect the efficiency of ERM and consequently 
its performance implications.     
Moreover, the researcher is motivated to study UK data for the following 
reason. After the GFC, demand for firm-level risk oversight has increased in the UK 
and internationally (COSO, 2010). The Walker (2009) report in the UK contributed 
to this demand by encouraging the formation of board-level risk committees separate 
from the audit committee and driving the adoption of an independent ERM function 
in listed companies. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 also mandated similar 
requirements but did not provide detailed prescription regarding the role, 
responsibilities, and processes of risk committees as compared to the UK regulations 
(Zhivitskaya, 2015). In this light, the current study reveals whether risk committees 
in the UK are structurally sufficient to fulfil their ERM oversight function as 
                                                 
 
18 This was among other factors including environmental uncertainty, industry competition, firm size, 
and firm complexity as contingency variables considered by Gordon et al. (2009).   
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expected by the Walker (2009) report. This study contributes to risk management 
literature in a UK setting. While there are studies that examine risk reporting patterns 
in UK listed companies (e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2005; 2006), the link between 
corporate governance and risk reporting (e.g. Abraham and Cox, 2007), and the 
effects of traditional risk management19 on firm value (e.g. Panaretou, 2014), there is 
a paucity of empirical evidence in the UK investigating the performance impacts of 
emerging ERM practices and how its role is influenced by the board’s risk oversight 
to date. This study is therefore motivated to fill this gap in risk management literature 
with respect to the UK evidence.     
 
1.6. Contributions of the Research 
This study contributes to the risk governance literature in the following ways. First, it 
extends the previous research by providing empirical evidence that ERM is 
positively associated with firm performance in UK companies. This suggests that the 
use of ERM is an efficient way of “internal” risk management to maximize 
shareholders’ wealth. Further, an ERM index is adopted from Gordon et al. (2009) to 
measure the level of ERM activity. This index not only reflects the mere presence of 
ERM in a company but also measures the effectiveness of ERM processes in order to 
achieve efficiency in business strategy, operations, reporting, and compliance as 
described by COSO (2004). This adds to the previous literature that measures the 
presence of ERM activity by using a binary variable (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; 
Lin, Wen and Yu, 2012, Lechner and Gatzert, 2016) and calls for further evidence 
based on more sophisticated measures of ERM. Second, as the formation of a risk 
                                                 
 
19 Traditional risk management majorly focuses on managing financial risks through hedging and 
insurance. This approach is different from ERM and ignores the holistic view of risk management. For 
information on the comparison between tradition risk management and ERM is discussed in Chapter 
4, Section 4.3.    
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committee is an emerging practice of ERM (Hines et al., 2015), this study adds to the 
literature by examining whether the structure and composition of a risk committee 
strengthens or weakens the valuation implications of ERM. The findings of this study 
suggest that the number of financial experts and the gender diversity in the risk 
committee positively influence the impact of ERM on firm performance. However, 
in contrast, this study also finds that risk committee size, number of meetings, and 
the number of outside directors negatively affect the valuation outcomes of ERM. 
The study highlights that the ERM function is adversely affected by the weak 
monitoring role of the risk committee. This study contributes to the risk governance 
literature by suggesting that the adoption of the risk committee concept is not a 
panacea for ERM oversight, which is complex and is greatly affected by the structure 
and composition of a delegated committee.   
 
1.7. Structure of the Thesis 
This study comprises six further chapters as described below. 
 Chapter-2 discusses regulatory guidelines relating to ERM and the risk 
committee. Chapter-3 discusses empirical literature on the relationship between 
ERM and firm performance, previous research on risk committees, and identifies the 
research gap. Chapter-4 debates the theoretical benefits of ERM in value creation, 
and the expected role of risk committees in the ERM process. With emphasis on the 
theory, the main focus of this chapter is to articulate hypotheses. Chapter-5 explains 
the research methods employed in this study to test the hypotheses and answer 
research questions. Chapter-6 presents and discusses statistical analyses based on the 
relationships developed in the previous chapters. Chapter-7 summarizes overall 
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findings and discusses the study’s practical implications, limitations, and avenues for 
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Chapter 2: Regulatory Review 
2.1. Chapter Introduction 
The development of risk governance in the UK is historically rich and has evolved 
via various guidelines such as the Cadbury Report, the Hampel Report, the Turnbull 
Guidance, the Higgs Review, the Smith Review, and the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance in 2006 that developed into the UK Corporate Governance 
Code in 2014. Consistent with the objectives of this study, which are to investigate 
the performance implications of ERM and to examine the moderating impacts of risk 
committee characteristics on this relationship, four relevant regulatory -/- 
professional guidelines are discussed in this Chapter. First, the COSO (2004) ERM 
framework which was issued in response to a series of corporate downfalls during 
the early 2000s is examined in Section 2.2 by considering a discussion on its basic 
objectives, components, and the duties of a risk committee to support the ERM 
function. In addition to providing a regulatory foundation, COSO’s ERM framework 
also provides a methodological base for the measurement of ERM in this study. 
Section 2.3 discusses the role of the board of directors in risk management based on 
the guidelines provided by the Financial Reporting Council (2010). Section 2.4 
provides a discussion on the formation of board-level risk committees in the UK and 
Sir David Walker’s (2009) recommendations. Section 2.5 discusses the 
responsibilities of the ARC as this study also conceptualizes it as an adoption of the 
risk committee concept.  Finally, the chapter provides a comparison of regulatory 
requirements on risk management among the various board-level committees in 
Section 2.6.   
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2.2. The COSO’s 2004 ERM Framework 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
was established in the year 1985 to support the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting. The purpose of the commission was to issue guidelines and 
recommendations relating to fraudulent financial reporting for public companies, 
external auditors, regulators, and for the educational sector. In relation to risk 
management, COSO issued its Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework 
in September 2004. The framework explained vital ERM components, discussed key 
principles and concepts, provided clear direction and guidance, and suggested a 
common ERM language in order to achieve organizational performance targets. 
According to COSO (2004, p.2) ERM is defined as: 
 
“…a process effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify 
potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk 
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity 
objectives.” 
 
The development of COSO’s ERM framework was an attempt to restore 
investors’ confidence and to enhance corporate governance and risk management 
practices after a series of high-profile corporate scandals and failures during 2000 to 
2003, such as Enron and WorldCom.20 The basic purpose of an ERM system is to 
enhance the capability of an organization to achieve high performance, prevent loss 
of resources, facilitate effective reporting and compliance, and avoid damage to its 
                                                 
 
20 For more information see Healy and Palepu (2003) and Zekany, Braun and Warder (2004). 
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reputation. Figure 2.1 depicts a three-dimensional COSO ERM matrix in the form of 
a cube that shows the relationship between four objectives, and eight components, 
across four different levels of the organization. The objectives and the components of 
the ERM framework are explained below.     
 
 
Figure 2.1. The COSO (2004) ERM Framework 
 
2.2.1. Organizational Objectives 
As depicted in Figure 2.1, the organizational objectives are divided into four major 
categories focusing on the following aspects of ERM. Based on these organizational 
objectives, this study has adopted the Gordon et al. (2009) index in order to proxy 
ERM effectiveness in a company. For more information please see Appendix A on 
the calculation of the ERM index.    
• Strategic: High-level goals, aligned with the entity and supporting its 
mission. This represents the ability of a firm to position itself in an 
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industry in comparison to its rivals. From a strategy perspective, an 
effective ERM function is expected to contribute to firm performance 
through maximizing the opportunities to generate sales / revenues and 
by lowering systematic risk within an industry.     
• Operations: Effective and efficient use of an entity’s resources. This 
represents the ability of a firm to increase its performance through 
proficient allocation of capital resources. Thus, an effective ERM 
process is expected to contribute to firm efficiency by increasing its 
ability to maximize input-output relationships.        
• Reporting: Reliability of an entity’s reporting framework. This is 
considered an important factor in affecting a firm’s overall risk. Indeed, 
poor financial reporting practices such as financial restatements, illegal 
earnings management, and financial frauds contributed to the high-
profile corporate scandals in early 2000s (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and 
Wright, 2004). An ERM is expected to strengthen internal control in 
order to achieve reporting reliability.   
• Compliance: Entity’s compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
The ERM promotes organizational stature by creating a compliance-
supporting culture.   
 
The COSO framework shows that an organization’s ERM can be evaluated 
based on the above four objectives. This study uses an ERM index based on these 
objectives in order to investigate the relationship between ERM and firm 
performance.    
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2.2.2. Components of ERM 
To achieve organizational objectives discussed in the previous section, the COSO 
(2004) ERM framework consists of the following eight interdependent components 
as depicted in Figure 2.1. They are reliant upon management’s choice of approach to 
running the organization and integrating with managerial processes.  
• Internal Environment. This is the tone of an organization that sets the basis 
for how risks are viewed. It includes overall risk management philosophy, 
risk attitude, culture and integrity, and the environment in which they 
operate.  
• Objective Settings. This component ensures that management should follow 
a proper process to set objectives that are aligned with the company’s 
mission and risk appetite.   
• Event Identification. There must be a clear process to identify internal and 
external events, their interdependencies, risks and opportunities, and how 
they affect the achievement of organizational objectives. 
• Risk Assessment. This includes a detailed analysis of risks with qualitative 
and quantitative methods in order to discover their impact on the 
achievement of objectives. The magnitude and probability of their 
occurrence should be assessed by management based on both an inherent and 
residual basis. The risk assessment should be completed at an individual 
event level, category level, and throughout the organization.      
• Risk Response. After the risk assessment, the management must decide how 
it is going to respond to those risks through avoidance, reduction, 
distribution, and acceptance. In doing so, the costs and benefits, risk appetite 
and tolerance levels of the organization should be considered.    
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• Control Activities. To ensure the effectiveness of the risk response, 
management should establish controls throughout the organization. These 
include verification, authorization and segregation of duties, physical 
inspection, and performance reviews.  
• Information and Communication. All the relevant information should be 
identified, captured, and communicated at all levels and in every direction 
within an organization in a sufficient time frame so that employees perform 
their responsibilities. This also includes communication with external 
stakeholders.   
• Monitoring. ERM requires continuous monitoring. This includes on-going 
review by management of operational reports to detect inaccuracies and 
identify weaknesses in the internal and external audit. Any deficiencies in 
ERM must be reported upstream from management to the board of directors 
so as to take corrective actions.    
 
These are overlapping categories as one component can fall in more than one 
category and may be the responsibility of executives at different levels of the 
organization. Overall, the COSO (2004) ERM framework focuses on value 
maximization through aligning risk appetite and strategy, enhancing risk response 
decisions, reducing operational surprises and losses, identifying and managing risks 
in a holistic manner, seizing opportunities, and efficient deployment of capital. 
However, ERM can provide reasonable assurance on the achievement of its stated 
objectives because of their dependence on the internal and external environment. 
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2.2.3. Duties of the Risk Committee Described by COSO (2004) 
In addition to the ERM framework discussed above, COSO (2004) also outlines the 
common responsibilities of the risk committee. It highlights that a risk committee is 
generally responsible for overseeing the ERM system of an organization which 
includes policies, programs, measures, and competencies for identifying, assessing 
and managing risks. 
Initially COSO (2004) discussed the formation of the risk committee in order 
to increase the direct focus of an organization on ERM. The framework particularly 
requires that the top-management should be the part of the risk committee meetings 
and contribute to the ERM discussion on risk appetite and risk tolerance. The 
specific responsibilities of the risk committee as mentioned in COSO (2004) are 
summarized as follows: 
• The oversight of the development of annual ERM strategy. 
• The development of organization-wide risk appetite and risk tolerance 
levels. 
• To oversee and give direction to senior managers involved in risk 
management, such as the Chief Risk Officer (CRO). 
• To evaluate and update the board about any key risk issue. 
• To evaluate the annual ERM report and trends and also ensure that the 
company’s strategy is in line with the issues raised. 
• To supervise the work of internal audit.   
• To review financial statements. 
 
The COSO’s ERM is a US based framework issued in response to the big 
corporate scandals in the US in the early 2000s. There are no specific UK-based 
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ERM guidelines; however, COSO’s ERM has been internationally adopted by 
companies, including those in the UK as depicted in Figure 1.1.     
 
2.3. Role of the Board of Directors in Risk Management 
The board of directors plays a key oversight role in the risk management processes of 
a company (Branson, 2010). In its monitoring function associated with risk 
management, the board establishes the “tone at the top” to ensure that the overall risk 
governance of the company is matched with the business strategy and operating 
decisions. Former board member of Hewlett Packard, George Jay, stated that the 
most important lesson learned from history is that the board of directors are not able 
to claim immunity about the ignorance of business risk (Chapman, 2011, p. 7). This 
sends a clear message that if something goes wrong, the board of directors will be 
held accountable. McCarthy, Flynn and Brownstein (2003) argued that the board of 
directors should be aware of any potential adverse events and the sources of possible 
organizational risks to gain advantage by taking pre-emptive actions. However, in the 
aftermath of the GFC, investors expressed their concern regarding the reliability of 
financial reporting, external auditors, and the degree of corporate risk management. 
Aggressive and unmonitored risk management is one of the key causes of the GFC, 
which resulted in unprecedented corporate bankruptcies, bank failures, and federal 
government interventions (Chapman, 2011). This led to corporate regulatory bodies 
and legislators around the world requiring boards to focus on risk management and 
prevention and to provide necessary disclosures (e.g. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2009; Ontario Securities Commission, 2010; FRC, 2010). Under this 
environment, boards must be aware that regulators can set new standards or 
reinterpret the existing ones to reconsider board responsibilities regarding ERM 
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(Branson, 2010). In the UK, the FRC (2010) puts ultimate responsibility for risk 
management on the board of directors, and sets the following guidelines for the 
board in relation to risk management and internal controls:   
• To ensure proper design and implementation of risk management and make 
robust assessment of principal risks.  
• To ascertain the nature and extent of risks faced by the company and 
determine its “risk appetite” in accordance with strategic objectives. 
• To make sure that appropriate risk culture and reward system are embedded 
in all levels of the organization. 
• To agree on the strategies to manage and reduce the probability of the 
occurrence of principal risks and their impact. 
• To monitor and review the functions of risk management and internal 
controls and ensure their effectiveness. 
• To satisfy itself on the safety of internal and external communication 
regarding risk management and internal controls.  
 
As per the FRC (2010) guidance, boards of directors are responsible for the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the overall risk governance function but it should not 
involve itself in day-to-day risk management and implementation activities as these 
are the responsibility of management. A board should satisfy itself that management 
has understood its policies and controls, and provide timely information for strategic 
decision making. Additionally, a board should exercise “oversight” function to 
satisfy itself regarding the ERM processes and should ensure that employees are 
following a proper risk culture throughout the organization (FRC, 2010; Branson, 
2010).  
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The “oversight” role of a board in relation to risk management should send a 
clear message throughout the organization that risk management is not a “check-the-
box” activity and should not only promote the conduct of business but also become 
an integral part of business strategy, culture and the wealth-creation process. A board 
of directors can deliver expert support and a clear direction for ERM. However, 
without the presence of a sufficient number of “risk experts” the overall risk 
management program may not deliver its full advantages or may be fated to fail. 
Therefore, the board and management are required to share responsibilities in order 
to promote a “risk culture” in the company and to ensure that the risk-taking 
activities are within the risk appetite and are aligned with strategic objectives.  
In addition to the board’s direct responsibility, an organization’s risk 
management framework should be designed in such a way that captures the board’s 
attention in order to understand and evaluate principal risks and possible mitigation 
plans. FRC (2010) outlines that, for an efficient function, it is critical for the board to 
have sufficient experience, training, and understanding of the company’s operations 
in order to make a valuable assessment of the risks. Furthermore, for active 
oversight, a board should establish a suitable governance structure to capture 
sufficient attention. Most of the time, this risk governance function comes under 
frequent review by an existing committee such as an audit committee as a part of its 
regular oversight agenda item. In the following section, the need for the formation of 
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2.4. Formation of the Board-level Standalone Risk Committee (SRC) in UK 
Companies 
The Financial Reporting Council charges a board of directors with full responsibility 
for overall risk management (FRC, 2010). However, in order to support its oversight 
role, a board can further delegate this function to a board-level committee. The main 
purpose of an assigned committee is to oversee the functions of risk management, 
review the process of ERM and receive regular risk reports from management. 
Subsequently, the committee reports to the board regularly regarding the risk profile 
of the company and provide necessary recommendations on any strategic risk-
informed decision needs. Usually this risk oversight function is delegated to the audit 
committee. The formation of an audit committee is a regulatory requirement in many 
countries including the UK which is generally charged with many responsibilities 
related to financial reporting, risk management, internal audit, external audit, and 
whistleblowing. Branson (2010) argues that charging an audit committee with the 
risk oversight function is not always a good option as this committee already has 
many other responsibilities which may limit its capacity to optimally oversee risk 
due to limited time and resources. The focus of an audit committee should be on the 
organization’s compliance with regulatory standards on financial reporting and 
auditing. Johnson (2010) argues that the risk oversight role may confuse and distract 
the audit committee’s major focus on organizational risk-issuance of misleading, 
inaccurate, or fraudulent financial reporting. Moreover, Brown et al. (2009) discuss 
that the audit committee is limited in its ability to address risk oversight for the 
following reasons. First, the recent regulations in many countries including the UK 
have dramatically increased the workload of audit committees. Second, surveys 
conducted by the KPMG Audit Committee Institute report that audit committees are 
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more focused on the oversight of financial reporting and related compliance risks 
rather than organizational risk management. Third, requirements for the recruitment 
of members for audit committees generally include financial acuity and firm 
independence. Finally, it is essential that most of the risk factors should be assessed 
by individuals within the firm. Therefore, assigning risk oversight to the audit 
committee may not be a good choice for overall risk governance. Branson (2010) 
argues that it is suitable for some companies to create a SRC to respond to the 
increased attention on risk oversight at board-level. 
In UK companies, the trend of forming a SRC for the risk oversight function 
has received significant attention in the post-GFC period (as depicted in the Figure 
1.2) and appears largely to be due to the issuance of Walker’s (2009) report. In the 
latest guidelines for audit committees, the FRC (2012) also recommends that the 
delegation of risk management oversight be to a SRC comprised of independent 
directors. It further suggests that an SRC on behalf of the board should oversee the 
ERM processes and provide guidance to management on providing information 
regarding risk management functions and assessments of principal risk exposures.  
 
2.4.1. Sir David Walker’s Recommendations 
On February 9, 2009, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform, the Financial Services Secretary to the Treasury, and the Secretary of State 
for Business,21 announced a review to provide recommendations to improve the 
corporate governance of UK banks and other financial institutions, specifically with 
respect to risk management practices. It was chaired by Sir David Walker and the 
final review was published on November 26, 2009 (Walker, 2009). The report 
                                                 
 
21 For more information visit: http://www.icaew.com/en/library/subject-gateways/corporate-
governance/codes-and-reports/walker-report [Accessed on 8th July 2016]. 
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provides recommendations on the governance of risk (outlined in Chapter 6 of the 
report).   
The review focuses on enhancing the risk governance by boards of directors 
through the formation of SRCs in order to capture information about increasing 
regulations and supervision requirements. It targets the board’s obligation to ensure 
the early detection and evaluation of risks, that efficient controls for risks are in 
place, that there is no mismatch between corporate strategy and risk appetite, and to 
build an enterprise-wide risk culture to alert employees at all level. Although the 
review recommends that at a minimum the boards of FTSE-100 listed banks and 
other financial companies establish SRCs, it clearly warns that ultimate responsibility 
and accountability of risk management still resides with the full board. The validity 
of the formation of an SRC is supported by the notion that audit committees are 
already busy with increasing responsibilities relating to financial reporting, internal 
controls and audit. The review concludes that audit committees are unable to 
adequately meet the growing demands of risk governance, and thus, it is 
recommended that boards should establish a SRC separate from the audit committee. 
The review recommends that the focus of a SRC should be on principal risks such as 
those relating to leverage, interest rates, currency fluctuations, liquidity and market 
risks. It further endorses that a SRC should make recommendations to the board after 
considering its view on capital and liquidity decisions. The Walker (2009) 
recommendations as relevant to this study are summarized in Appendix B.  
 
2.5. Responsibilities of a Combined Audit and Risk Committee (ARC) 
Some companies choose a combined ARC, thus employing the same committee 
members to overview both audit and risk management functions of the company. 
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While there are no regulatory or professional guidelines in the UK that outline the 
specific roles and duties of a combined ARC, the Governance Institute of Australia 
(GIA) recognizes that a combined ARC is expected to attend to all the 
responsibilities that are assigned to a SRC and an audit committee (GIA, 2014). It 
further summarizes the general responsibilities of a combined ARC as follows: 
• To review the integrity of overall corporate financial reporting. 
• To oversee the company’s relationships with external auditors that includes 
but is not limited to the engagement, re-engagement, audit and non-audit fees, 
and issues relating to resignation or dismissal. 
• To review internal audit and internal financial controls.  
• To oversee whistleblowing arrangements. 
• To review and make recommendations to the board on overall risk 
management processes. 
• To review the effectiveness of the corporate risk management framework. 
• To review and monitor the risk management compliance with relevant 
regulatory requirements. 
• To review and make suggestions to the board on current and future risk 
appetite. 
• To oversee and make recommendations to the board regarding the work of 
the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) including their appointment and removal.  
 
This study also considers the ARC in the conceptualization of the risk 
committee concept22 on the following grounds. First, among other risk management 
                                                 
 
22 The conceptualization of the adoption of the risk committee concept is discussed in the Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3.  
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functions, the ARC is also responsible for risk appetite, which is an important part of 
the ERM oversight function (Zhivitskaya, 2015). Andersen, Garvey and Roggi 
(2014) explain that risk appetite is part of strategic risk planning and a core practice 
in financial businesses. It is also necessary for allocation of capital (KPMG, 2013). 
Power (2009) explains the importance of risk appetite in a theoretical perspective: 
“organizations should seek to identify all material risks to their objectives and sub-
objectives, design controls and mitigations which produce a residual risk consistent 
with a target risk appetite, and monitor this entire process, making feedback 
adjustments as necessary. The model is that of a thermostat which adjusts to changes 
in environment subject to pre-given target temperature” (p. 849). 
Secondly, the ARC is also responsible for overseeing the functions of the 
CRO, which is crucial to overall ERM. Beasley, Pagach and Warr (2008) discuss 
how the success of the ERM program depends on an appropriate leadership structure 
that aids to manage the identification, assessment, measurement, and response to all 
principal risks faced by the business. Similarly, COSO (2004) also highlights that 
without the support of proper leadership from senior management in implementing 
ERM, cultural differences in risk assessments and responses are likely to result, 
leading to inconsistency in the overall risk management. To respond to this 
challenge, organizations usually hire a member from senior management known as a 
CRO to manage the processes of ERM. Therefore, if the ARC is responsible for 
making recommendations to the board on the duties and functions of the CRO, it is 
actually overseeing the overall ERM function. Based on these reasons, this study also 
considers the ARC as a type of risk committee that is responsible for the efficiency 
of ERM.      
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2.6. A Comparison of Regulatory Requirements on Risk Management 
Table 2.1 compares the regulatory requirements of SRC, ARC, and audit committees 
regarding risk management. It should be noted that there are similarities between the 
requirements of the ARC and the audit committee, as any board-level committee 
combined with an audit committee should follow the FRC (2012) guidelines on audit 
committees. At the moment, there are no specific guidelines for the ARC in the UK. 
Therefore, for the purpose of comparison, the requirements for the ARC are 
compiled from both FRC (2012) and GIA (2014). 
 
Table 2.1. A Comparison of Regulatory Requirements on Risk Management 
No. Description SRC ARC Audit 
Committee 
Structure and Composition 
1 Formation of the committee Voluntary Voluntary Comply or 
Explain 
2 Minimum committee size Not 
specified 
Three Three 
3 Number of outside members 

























Responsibilities for Risk Management Processes 
7 The committee is responsible for risk 
management 
   
8 To provide risk oversight and advice 
to the board 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
9 To aid in risk monitoring ✓ ✓ ✓ 
10 To review risk reports from internal 
and external sources 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
11 To aid in the identification of principal 
risk and key risk indicators  
✓ ✓ ✓ 
12 To advise management on risk 
assessment arrangements 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
13 To review critical controls and 
weaknesses in risk management 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
14 To recommend risk appetite and ✓ ✓  
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tolerance levels 
15 To review the activities of CRO ✓ ✓  
16 To review and monitor regulatory 
compliance on risk management   
✓ ✓  
17 To promote a risk awareness culture ✓   
18 To review and approve risk 
management implementation plans and 
actions 
✓   
19 The committee considers stress testing 
and scenario analysis when making 
recommendations to the board 
✓   
20 To provide assurance on risk 
communication 
✓   
Reporting Requirements on Risk Management Processes 
21 The committee is responsible for 
producing separate report on risk 
management as part of annual report  
✓ ✓  
22 To provide description of risk 
management practices 
✓   
23 To report information of inherent risks ✓   
24 To report its evaluation of potential 
risks 
✓   
25 To report information on any stress 
testing or scenario analysis carried out 
during the year 
✓   
Notes: The above requirements on risk management are compiled from various sources: (Walker, 
2009) for the SRC, (FRC, 2012; GIA, 2014) for the ARC, and (FRC, 2012) for the audit committee.  
 
First, with regard to structure and composition, Table 2.1 identifies that the 
requirements for a SRC are less specified compared to an ARC or audit committee. 
For instance, in an ARC or audit committee the minimum number of members 
should not be less than three, but SRC size is not specified (Walker, 2009). Similarly, 
the ARC and audit committee members are required to meet a minimum of three 
times in a financial year, but there is no such requirement for a SRC. The regulatory 
guidelines suggest that there should be at least one financial expert in all three 
committees. 
Secondly, Table 2.1 compares responsibilities regarding risk management 
processes. Generally, it shows that risk oversight, monitoring, and advising 
management on risk assessments are common in all three types of committees. 
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However, the audit committee is not required to make recommendations to the board 
on risk appetite and tolerance levels, to oversee the activities of the CRO and to 
ensure regulatory compliance on risk management. The SRC and ARC are 
responsible for these activities because they are crucial for ERM processes (COSO, 
2004). In addition to common responsibilities, the SRC is further required to promote 
a risk culture, to review risk management implementation plans and actions, and to 
ensure the communication of risk information.    
Finally, Table 2.1 also provides comparison on risk reporting requirements. 
Both the SRC and ARC are required to produce a separate report on risk 
management practices. As per Walker (2009), the SRC has to provide more 
comprehensive reporting on risk management. The SRC is responsible for providing 
a description of the firm’s risk management process. The SRC should report on the 
firm’s inherent risks, and also an evaluation of potential risks. As per the FRC 
(2012), audit committees are not required to report on corporate risk management 
processes. This study posits that the expected risk oversight function of a dedicated 
committee is dependent upon its structure and composition. For instance, the size or 
the frequency of meetings of the SRC could affect its monitoring effectiveness with 
regard to reviewing ERM functions such as risk appetite and tolerance levels, or to 
oversee the activities of the CRO. Thus, an efficient monitoring system would 
enhance the effectiveness of a firm’s ERM function that in turns positively 
contributes to firm performance.       
 
2.7. Chapter Summary 
First, this chapter summarizes COSO’s (2004) ERM framework, in which it is 
discussed that an ERM function has four main organizational objectives to improve 
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its strategy, operations, reporting, and compliance. The assurances on these strategic 
objectives are developed from eight major components that include internal 
environment, event identification, risk assessment, risk response, control activities, 
information and communication, and monitoring. The duties of a risk committee as 
outlined in COSO (2004) are then summarized. Second, the chapter explains the role 
of a board in risk management using the guidelines provided by the FRC (2010). 
This is followed by a discussion of the fact that a company’s board has full 
responsibility of overall risk management activities but it can delegate the oversight 
task to a board-level committee in order to assist in the risk management function. 
Thirdly, arguments related to the delegation of the risk oversight function to a SRC 
are explored, summarizing Sir David Walker’s (2009) recommendations on 
formation of SRCs in the UK. The general responsibilities of a combined ARC are 
also investigated. It is noted that a combined ARC is expected to attend to all 
responsibilities of an SRC and audit committee. Finally, the chapter compares the 













Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1. Chapter Introduction 
Based on the regulatory importance discussed in the previous chapter regarding ERM 
and risk committees, this chapter discusses empirical evidence from the literature and 
identifies gaps in previous research. Firstly, the literature on the relationship between 
ERM and firm performance is discussed in Section 3.2. Previous research relating to 
the various impacts of risk committees on risk management and firm performance is 
explored in Section 3.3. Finally, the literature gap and focus of this study is outlined 
in Section 3.4. 
 
3.2. Empirical Research on ERM and Firm Performance Relationship 
The seminal contributions of Markowitz (1952) and Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
postulate that in the presence of perfect capital markets, risk management is 
impractical and does not add value. Since their theories are grounded on the 
principles of market efficiency, subsequent research in the last few decades has 
recognized the valuation implications of risk management (Nocco and Stulz, 2006). 
For instance, under market frictions the benefits of risk management have been 
realized through taxes (Modigliani and Miller, 1963); bankruptcy costs (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973); agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); and external capital 
costs (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993). Subsequently, Smith and Stulz (1985) 
argue that proper risk management reduces the chance of financial distress and 
bankruptcy costs. It also reduces stock price and earnings volatility and contributes 
towards higher capital efficiency (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). The focus of 
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researchers during this period (prior to the financial collapses of the early 2000s and 
the GFC) is mostly on the traditional silo-based risk management that fails to account 
for interdependencies between various risks at multiple levels. This section 
summarizes the emerging research on the topic and discuses empirical evidence on 
the relationship between ERM and firm performance.                      
The empirical research on ERM can be classified into two main categories.23 
The first group of literature emphasises implementation and the determinants of 
ERM, and the second group discusses its consequences such as firm performance. 
The current study focuses on research related to ERM and the firm performance 
relationship. It is also noted that nearly all studies on ERM and firm performance are 
conducted in US settings. Table 3.1 provides a summary of previous research on this 
topic. Starting with the studies arguing that ERM is not value relevant, Beasley et al. 
(2008) examine the impact of firm specific variables on the stock market reaction 
based on the announcement of hiring ERM senior managers from 1992 to 2003. 
They find no significant market response on hiring a chief risk officer (CRO), but 
cross-sectional analysis shows significant firm-specific effects on cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR). Similar evidence is reported by Pagach and Warr (2010) 
who examined the change in several financial variables before and after the 
appointment of a CRO from 1992 to 2004 and found reduced earnings volatility but 
failed to support the value relevance implications of ERM. Further, McShane et al. 
(2011), by using S&P ERM rating scores from 82 US insurance companies as of 
2008 also reported no additional increase in firm value when moving from traditional 
risk management to ERM. In a subsequent study, Lin, Wen and Yu (2012) report 
evidence from 85 companies within the US property and casualty insurance industry 
                                                 
 
23 For a comprehensive review on ERM research see Gatzert and Martin (2015).  
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for a period from 2000 to 2007, finding that ERM adoption is linked with adverse 
market reaction. They further report that ERM shows a strong negative relationship 
with firm performance. However, these studies have major limitations. They focus 
on capturing short-term market responses regarding ERM implementation and utilise 
measures of ERM that are unable to capture the success of the program. These 
limitations are successfully taken into consideration by subsequent researchers.  
A further group of literature argues that ERM implementation is value 
relevant and also increases firm performance. Gordon et al. (2009) examine the 
contingency argument of the ERM and firm performance relationship by taking a 
sample of 112 US firm for the year 2005. Their findings verify the argument that a 
proper match between ERM and contingency variables (environmental uncertainty, 
competition within industry, firm complexity, firm size, and monitoring by board of 
directors) contributes to firm performance as measured by a one-year excess stock 
market return. Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) by using a dummy variable for ERM 
implementation for 117 US insurance firms, report that ERM increases shareholders’ 
wealth by at least 20% measured by Tobin’s Q. Following these studies, recent 
research has employed more sophisticated measures of ERM. Baxter et al. (2013) 
use an ERM quality measure for 55 US firms for the period 2006 to 2008 and find 
that companies with higher ERM quality have a stronger financial position and 
higher market value, and that ERM is strongly associated with firm performance 
during the rebound period after the GFC. Similarly, by using ERM maturity levels 
Farrell and Gallagher (2015) provide evidence from 225 firms from multiple 
countries for the period 2006 to 2011. However, as 88% of their sample is comprised 
of only US companies, the results of this study may be biased towards the US. They 
find that ERM maturity levels are positively linked with firm value, with a maximum 
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magnitude of 25%. Upon decomposition of ERM maturity, they further report that 
top-down executive engagement and an ERM culture throughout the organization are 
the most important elements from a value generation perspective. Lechner and 
Gatzert (2016) also support similar value relevance propositions of ERM in a 
German setting. Moreover, apart from the ERM effects on firm value, Grace et al. 
(2015) find an ERM impact on cost and revenue efficiency in US property liability 
and insurance industries. They report that ERM initiatives increase efficiency at a 
maximum rate when there is a link between the economic capital model and a 




Table 3.1. Empirical Research on ERM and Firm Performance Relationship 
Reference  Contribution Method Findings Future Research 
Beasley, Pagach 
and Warr (2008) 
• This study investigates the 
impact of firm specific 
variables on the equity 
market response on the 
announcements of hiring 
ERM senior managers.  
• Based on a total 120 
announcements of US 
companies from 1992 to 
2003, the study employs 
White t-Test and multiple 
regression analyses to 
discover the significant 
differences and impact on 
cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR).    
• Empirical analysis reveals 
that in general there is no 
significant market 
response on the 
appointments of Chief 
Risk Officers (CRO).  
• The cross-sectional 
regression analysis reveals 
that there are significant 
firm-specific effects (firm 
size and earnings 
volatility) for non-
financial companies on the 
equity returns relating to 
CRO appointments.    
• There is a need to 
examine the impacts of 
more specific ERM 
related announcements 
such as senior executives 
overseeing the ERM 
function.  
• To examine the long-term 
benefits of ERM such as 
future cash flows.  
• Examine the benefits of 
ERM for stakeholders 
other than shareholders. 
• It necessary to investigate 
the impact of ERM on risk 
reporting. 
Gordon, Loeb and 
Tseng (2009) 
• This study examines the 
argument that firm 
performance implications 
of ERM depends upon five 
contingency factors: 
environment, competition, 
complexity, firm size, and 
monitoring.  
• Based on keyword 
searching to identify ERM 
implementation in year 
2005, the final sample 
consists of 112 US 
companies. The data is 
analysed using linear 
regression.      
• The study verifies its basic 
argument and concludes 
that ERM significantly 
affects firm performance 
dependent upon 
contingency variables.  
• Authors recommend that 
the future research should 
collect data for more than 
one time period, and use 
other firm performance 
measures such as Tobin’s 
Q.  
Pagach and Warr 
(2010) 
• The purpose of this study 
is to examine change in 
performance after 
implementation of ERM. 
• Final sample consists of 
106 US companies from 
1992 to 2004.  
• Significant differences in 
several financial variables 
were tested before and 
after the appointment of 
CRO.  
• Analyses reveal that 
companies may experience 
a decreased risk in 
earnings.  
• However, results fail to 
find support for the 
hypothesis that the 
adoption of ERM creates 
shareholders’ wealth.  
• Further research in ERM 
is recommended based on 
powerful tests, extended 
time periods, and key 
metrics to measure ERM’s 
implementation efficacy.   
McShane, Nair • Addresses research gap on • Tobin’s Q is the dependent • Results support a positive • There is need for 
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and Rustambekov 
(2011) 
how well ERM is 
implemented. By using 
Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) ERM rating, the 
study examines ERM 
relationship with 
performance.   
variable as a measure of 
firm performance and S&P 
ERM rating is the key 
independent variable.  
• Data is collected from 82 
US insurance companies 
as of 2008.  
• The authors use multiple 
regression analysis to 
analyse impact of ERM 
ratings on firm value. 
impact on value with 
increasing levels of 
traditional risk 
management.  
• However, the study does 
not find support that 
higher ERM rating is 
positively linked with firm 
value. 
interdisciplinary research 
in ERM.  
• A multidisciplinary 
approach would provide 
more clarity into the ERM 
and performance 
relationship.   
Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2011) 
• The main objective of this 
study is to examine the 
value relevance of ERM 
implementation by U.S 
public insurance 
companies.   
• Tests the impact of ERM 
on firm value, with data 
collected from 117 US 
companies from 1998 to 
2005.  
• ERM is measured as a 
dichotomous variable and 
Tobin’s Q is used to proxy 
firm performance.  
• The relationship is 
analysed using maximum 
likelihood estimation 
(MLE). 
• The ERM is found to be 
value relevant and increase 
shareholders’ wealth by at 
least 20%.  
• Future research could 
consider larger samples 
and more refined 
measures of ERM. 
Lin, Wen and Yu 
(2012) 
• To examine tendencies 
towards adopting ERM.  
• To determine the patterns 
of individual risk 
management (IRM) 
adjustments after ERM 
adoption.  
• To investigate the ERM 
impacts on performance.  
• The study data gathers 
data from 85 companies in 
US property and casualty 
insurance industry for the 
period 2000 to 2007.  
• The sample consists of 31 
ERM firms and 54 non-
ERM firms.  




Model, and OLS 
regression.  
• The results indicate that 
the companies having high 
level of reissuance 
purchase and international 
diversifications are more 
oriented towards ERM 
adoption.  
• After the adoption of ERM 
the degree of IRM 
adjustments is important.  
• The ERM shows strong 
negative relationship with 
value (measured by 
Tobin’s Q) and accounting 
• To investigate the 
differences in value 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) 
among various ERM 
quality rating companies.  
• Authors expect that 
market would respond 
positively to higher ERM 
quality ratings.  
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performance (measured by 




• This study examines the 
determinants of ERM 
quality levels and their 
impact on firm 
performance.  
• The data is collected from 
financial companies in the 
US from 2006 to 2008 and 
the final sample comprises 
of 165 firm-year 
observations.  
• ERM quality measure is 
taken from the S&P 
Ratings Direct database.  
• Different regression 
analyses are performed to 
test the impact and 
associations.  
• The study found 
companies with higher 
ERM quality are generally 
strong in their financial 
position and corporate 
governance.  
• After controlling for the 
effects of endogeneity, the 
findings indicate positive 
association between higher 
ERM rating and 
accounting and market 
value.  
• ERM is strongly 
associated during the 
rebound period after the 
GFC.  
• Current research settings 
should be considered in 
other industries, to 
consider differences 
between industries.  
Farrell and 
Gallagher (2015) 
• The study investigates the 
relationship between ERM 
maturity levels and firm 
value. 
• The study examines 225 
companies from various 
countries.  
• The data is collected 
through RIMS over the 
period of 2006 to 2011.  
• Data is biased to US with 
88% of the data from US 
companies.  
• Different regression 
analyses are employed to 
test the relationships. 
• Companies with higher 
ERM maturity levels are 
positively linked with firm 
value by a significant 
magnitude of 25%. 
• The decomposition of 
ERM suggests top-down 
executive engagement and 
an ERM culture as the 
most important factors 
from value generation 
perspective.  
• Extension in cross-
sectional and time-series 
variance would provide 
deeper understanding.  
• Unbiased (independent) 
measures of ERM 
maturity may be possible 
through qualitative 
designs. 
• Future studies should 
focus on the value 
relevance of higher levels 




• This study seeks to 
examine the impact of the 
different aspects of ERM 
on cost and revenue 
efficiency. 
• Data is collected from US 
companies in property 
liability and insurance 
industries for 2004 and 
2006 through Tillinghast 
• The ERM initiatives 
increase cost and revenue 
efficiency.  
• The efficiency 
implications of ERM are at 
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Towers Perrin ERM 
survey.  
• The final sample of the 
study comprises of 532 
firm-year observations.  
• The study used univariate 
and weighted least square 
regression analyses to test 
the impacts.  
maximum when there is a 
link between an economic 
capital model and 
dedicated risk manager 




• This study investigates the 
determinants and valuation 
implications of ERM in 
German companies. 
• The sample of the study 
consists of 329 firm-year 
observations for the period 
from 2009 to 2013 from 
German companies. 
• Tobin’s Q is used as the 
measure of firm 
performance. The 
independent variable, 
ERM is taken as a dummy.  
• Authors employed logistic 
regression and cox 
proportional hazard model 
to test the relationships. 
• Results indicate that size, 
international 
diversification, and 
industry are the most 
common determinants of 
ERM implementation. 
Also, the ERM 
significantly increases firm 
value measured by Tobin’s 
Q. 
• Future research should use 
a questionnaire to access 






3.3. Empirical Research on Risk Committees 
The board-level risk committee is an emerging area of research. The literature in this 
domain is currently evolving in three emergent dimensions. The first dimension 
focuses on the determinants of the establishment of risk committees. The second 
dimension examines the impact of the risk committee on firm risk management 
outcomes. The third dimension investigates the performance implications of risk 
committees. Each of these dimensions is discussed in the following sections and 
Table 3.2 provides a summary of previous research.   
The first dimension of research investigates the determinants of the formation 
of risk committees. Subramaniam et al. (2009) examines the corporate governance 
and firm specific determinants of risk management committees in 200 Australian 
companies in 2005. Their study reveals that companies with larger board size and an 
independent chairperson are more likely to form a risk committee. The presence of 
risk committees in this study is also found to be linked with higher financial 
reporting risk and lower organizational complexity. Yatim (2010) provides evidence 
from 690 non-financial Malaysian companies for the year 2003. This study also find 
the establishment of risk committees to be associated with large boards, structured 
with a higher proportion of non-executive directors, separation of chief executive 
officer (CEO) and chairman positions, greater expertise, more diligence and the 
ability to reflect their obligations and responsiveness to internal controls. Sekome 
and Lemma (2014) find consistent results using data from 182 non-financial South 
African listed companies. They identify that board independence, board size, firm 
size, and industry type are significant factors in determining the establishment of a 
risk committee. They fail to find support for the existence of an independent board 
chairman, auditor reputation, reporting risk, and financial leverage as having 
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influence on the firm’s decision to establish a risk committee. Finally, Hines and 
Peters (2015) examine 47 US financial companies with a risk committee from 1994 
to 2008. Apart from the factors that have been discovered in prior research, they find 
that companies with international banking activity, higher leverage, lower financial 
reporting quality, merger and acquisition activity, and a Big N auditor are more 
likely to establish a risk committee. 
The second dimension of risk committee literature investigates the 
relationships between risk committees and risk management outcomes. Ng et al. 
(2013) examine the relationship between risk committee characteristics and risk 
taking by Malaysian insurance companies. Based on 329 firm-year observations for 
the time period of 2003 to 2011, their study reveals that risk committee size and 
independence are negatively associated with underwriting risk. Tao and Hutchinson 
(2013) investigate the relationship between characteristics of both compensation and 
risk committees, and risk and performance of Australian companies. Their study 
reveals that both compensation and risk committees are positively associated with 
market risk and firm performance. Moreover, they find that overlap between the two 
committees reduces information asymmetry. Consistent with the argument that 
presence of a risk committee is positively linked with risk, Hines et al. (2015), by 
using a large sample comprising of 6802 firm-year observations from US companies, 
find that the presence of a risk committee is positively associated with audit fee. 
They support their findings using the framework of auditor’s supply-side effect and 
argue that a risk committee can reasonably affect audit fees by increasing an 
auditor’s efforts and testing for assessments of inherent and control risks. 
Furthermore, in a recent study of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, it has 
been found that the presence of a risk committee and its various attributes are 
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positively associated with risk information generation which in turn delivers higher 
market risk disclosures (Al‐Hadi, Hasan and Habib, 2016).  
The third dimension of literature relates to the association between the 
presence of a risk committee, its characteristics and firm performance. Evidence in 
this area is mixed and do not establish unidirectional relationships. Based on the 
concept of excessive risk detection to lower the overall risk, Tao and Hutchinson 
(2013) provide evidence from Australian companies for the period from 2006 to 
2008. On the basis of 711 firm-year observations they find positive association 
between characteristics of compensation and risk committees and financial 
performance in Australia. However, their study finds a negative impact on 
performance when there is an overlap between two committees.24 In another 
Australian study based on a longer time frame from 1999 to 2007 for 118 listed 
companies, Hoque, Islam, and Azam (2013) examine the relationship between 
different board committees’ meetings and financial performance by following the 
concept of improved ERM function through committee diligence. Their analysis 
reveals that the audit and remuneration committees’ meetings are positively and 
significantly related with performance measures by return on equity (ROE) and 
return on assets (ROA). However, they fail to find support for the impact of risk 
committee diligence on performance. Subsequently in Malaysian settings, Wu et al. 
(2016) study the effect of risk committee characteristics on the efficiency of 30 
insurance companies for the period from 2008 to 2013. By employing a dynamic 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach, they find that a number of risk 
committee characteristics (except meetings) positively and significantly affect firm 
                                                 
 
24 Tao and Hutchinson (2013) used principal component analysis to extract common factors based on 
the characteristics of risk and compensation committees. Thus, their analysis is limited to isolating the 
impact of each variable related to committee structure and composition. 
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efficiency. However, they further find that the moderating effect of risk committee 




Table 3.2. Empirical Research on Risk Committees 




• This study investigates the 
corporate governance and 
firm specific determinants 
of the formation of risk 
management committees 
• The data is collected for 
the year 2005 from ASX 
300 companies. 
• Final sample consists of 
200 companies after the 
elimination of missing 
information.  
• The relationships were 
analysed using logistic 
regression. 
• The risk committee is 
expected to exist when the 
board size is large and the 
chairman is independent.  
• The presence of a risk 
committee is also linked 
with higher levels of 
financial reporting risk 
and lower levels of 
organizational complexity.  
• There is a need to 
consider a larger sample. 
• Alternative research 
methods should be 
employed.  
• To compare the evidence 
between combined risk 
committee and separate 
risk committee. 
Yatim (2010) • This study investigates the 
impact of board structures 
on the formation of a risk 
committee. 
• The data is collected from 
690 non-financial 
Malaysian companies for 
the year 2003.  
• Logistic regression was 
employed to analyse the 
relationships.  
• Findings suggest that the 
formation of a stand-alone 
risk committee is linked 
with the presence of strong 
boards having a higher 
percentage of non-
executive directors and 
separate CEO and 
chairman positions. 
• It found that increasing 
levels of board expertise 
and diligence is associated 
with the formation of a 
committee. 
• Further, it is found that 
firm size, business 
operations complexity, 
and having one the of Big 
Four audit firms are also 
positively associated with 
the formation of a risk 
committee.   
• The author suggests that a 
qualitative study should 
be used for in-depth 
investigation.  
• The role of holistic risk 
management processes 
should be useful for future 
research. 
• The role of managerial 
independence and 
objectives. 
• To investigate the 
association between 
ownership structures and 
formation of risk 
committees.  
Ng, Chong and 
Ismail (2013) 
• The purpose of this study 
is to examine the 
• The final sample consists 
of 329 firm-year 
• The study finds that the 
risk committee size and 
• Future research should 
consider other study 
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relationship between risk 
committee characteristics 
and risk taking. 
observations from 
Malaysia’s insurance 
companies for the time 
period 2003-2011.  
• Pooled OLS and fixed 
effects regressions were 
used to test the 
relationships. 
independence are 
negatively associated with 
underwriting risk. 
settings and the use of 
market risk proxies.  
Tao and 
Hutchinson (2013) 
• The objective of this study 
is to investigate the impact 
of the compensation 
committee and risk 
committee on risk and 
financial performance of 
Australian companies.  
• The data is collected from 
Australian financial 
companies listed in 
Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX).  
• The unbalanced panel data 
set contains 711 firm-year 
observations for the period 
from 2006 to 2008.  
• For inferential analysis, 
the study used factor 
analysis, GLS regression, 
and 2SLS regression.  
• The results show that the 
characteristics of 
compensation and risk 
committee are positively 
linked with risk and firm 
performance.  
• The overlap between the 
two committees reduces 
information asymmetry 
but moderates a negative 
risk and performance 
relationship.  
• The authors suggest the 
use of qualitative research 
for in-depth investigation 
of the current research 
findings.  
Hoque, Islam and 
Azam (2013) 
• The purpose of the study 
is to test the impact of 
board committees’ 
meetings on firm financial 
performance.  
• The data is collected from 
118 Australian listed 
companies for the years 
from 1999 to 2007.  
• The data is analysed using 
pooled OLS, fixed effects 
regression, generalised 
method of moments 
(GMM).   
• The analysis reveals that 
diligence of audit and 





• Risk committee meetings 
show a negative but 
insignificant impact on 
financial performance.   
• The qualifications and the 
years of service of the 
board of directors can 
work as an important 
input in the existing 
relationships.   
Sekome and 
Lemma (2014) 
• The study investigated the 
connection between firm 
specific factors and the 
formation of the separate 
risk committee. 
• The final sample consists 
of 182 non-financial South 
African listed companies 
for the year 2012.  
• The study employed 
logistic regression analysis 
• The study finds board size, 
board independence, firm 
size, and industry type are 
positively linked with the 
formation of a risk 
committee.    
• Authors suggest that 
future research should 
consider cross-country 
studies.  
• Use of governance 
attributes other than used 
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to investigate the 
relationships. 
in this research (such as 
gender and ownership 
structure).  
• The use of panel data. 
Hines, Masli, 
Mauldin and Peters 
(2015) 
• Based on the auditor’s 
supply side factors the 
study examines the 
relationship between risk 
committee and the audit 
fee. 
• The study uses a large 
panel data set covering the 
years from 2003 to 2011.  
• The final data set consists 
of 3980 firm-year 
observations.  
• Analysis was performed 
through employing OLS 
regression, Heckman self-
selection model, and 
Propensity Score Matched 
(PSM).  
• The study found that the 
presence of a risk 
committee is associated 
with higher audit fee.  
• Risk committee 
independence and overlap 
with audit committee are 
linked with lower audit 
fee. 
• Authors suggest future 
research should be done 
on the relationships 
between risk committee 
and financial reporting 
outcomes.  
• Investigation of the 
assignment of risk 
activities to risk 
committee can be 
investigated with 
operational and regulatory 
risk areas.  
Hines and Peters 
(2015) 
• The purpose of the study 
is to investigate the 
determinants and the 
consequences of risk 
committees.  
• The sample consists of 47 
financial companies in the 
US with a separate risk 
committee from 1994 to 
2008.  
• The study used pooled 
OLS regression for the 
analysis.  
• Findings show that 
companies with 
international banking 
activity, higher number of 
independent directors on 
the board, higher leverage, 
lower financial reporting 
quality, a Big N auditor, 
and M&A activity are 
likely to establish a 
separate risk committee.  
• Risk committee is 
negatively associated with 
profitability. 
• Future research should 
examine the impacts of 
emerging governance 
committees.  
Wu, Kweh, Lu and 
Azizan (2016) 
• The purpose of this study 
is to investigate the impact 
of risk committee 
structure, composition and 
prestige on efficiency. 
• The study also examines 
• The data set consist of 30 
insurance companies in 
the Malaysia for the years 
from 2008 to 2013.  
• The analysis is performed 
in two stages. First, a 
• It is found that the risk 
committee characteristics 
are associated with higher 
efficiency.  
• The prestige negatively 
affects risk committee and 
• A cross-country study 
should be done to cover 
larger number of 
insurance companies.  
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whether the relationship 
between risk committee 
characteristics and firm 
efficiency is strengthens or 
weakens by prestige of 
risk committee members.   
dynamic network slacks-
based model is adopted to 
measure efficiency scores. 
Secondly, a truncated 
regression is employed to 
investigate the 
relationships.   
efficiency relationship.   
Hadi, Hasan and 
Habib (2016) 
• The main purpose of the 
study is to examine the 
relationship between risk 
committee and market risk 
disclosures.  
• The study compares the 
results through different 
firm life cycle stages. 
• A total 677 firm-year 
observations from 
financial companies are 
analysed for the years 
from 2007 to 2011.  
• This is a cross-country 
study containing data from 
6 capital markets of Gulf 
Cooperation Council 
(GCC).  
• To test the relationships 
the authors first employed 
factors analysis on risk 
committee characteristics 
and then used OLS 
regression.   
• The results show that 
structure and composition 
of the risk committee are 
positively associated with 
market risk disclosures 
particularly in matured 
firms.    
• Future research should 
consider developing 
economies and investigate 
the effects of market risk 
disclosures on costs of 
information asymmetry. 
• The relationship between 
market risk disclosures 
and foreign institutional 
investors is another area 






3.4. The Literature Gap and Research Questions 
The prior literature on the outcomes attached with ERM or risk committee is vast and 
delivers mixed results. For instance, as discussed in the previous the section, prior 
research has failed to establish strong associations between ERM and firm 
performance (Beasley et al., 2008; Pagach and Warr, 2010; McShane et al., 2011; 
Lin et al., 2012). In contrast, other studies claim that ERM is positively associated 
with firm performance and contributes to shareholders’ wealth (Gordon et al., 2009; 
Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Baxter et al., 2013; Farrell and Gallagher, 2015). The 
literature highlights that much of the evidences on ERM is based in US settings. This 
study extends the research on the performance implications25 of ERM in a UK setting 
to consider whether US findings can be replicated in the UK. Although there is 
empirical evidence related to risk management based on the UK data, the research is 
not directly associated with the purpose of this study. For instance, Linsley and 
Shrives (2005) examine risk information disclosure in annual reports of FTSE-100 
listed companies in the UK. Using quantitative content analysis (with a sentence-
based approach), their study reveals that companies are reporting risk information in 
various dimensions under financial and non-financial risk categories. However, they 
argue that companies do not provide the full picture of the reported risk information 
in their annual reports and mostly report generalized statements on risk policy. In 
subsequent studies on risk reporting in the UK, researchers have found that the level 
of risk disclosures in the annual reports is influenced by the firm-level and 
governance variables (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). 
                                                 
 
25 Please see note 9.  
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Panaretou (2014) examines the relationship between risk management and 
firm performance in the UK, with the results revealing that risk management, 
through interest rate hedging, is not significantly associated with firm performance as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. It should be noted that the study of Panaretou (2014) is more 
linked with testing the impacts of traditional risk management rather than ERM. In a 
more recent European study, Florio and Leoni (Forthcoming) provide evidence from 
Italian listed companies on ERM impacts on firm performance. They find that the 
implementation of an effective ERM program leads to higher firm performance by 
reducing risk exposures. Furthermore, in a recent Norwegian study, Meidell and 
Kaarbøe (Forthcoming) argue that an effective ERM adds value to the organization 
by influencing its decision-making patterns in two stages. First, at the vertical 
horizon, ERM influence the decisions of top management regarding the acceptance 
of latest risk management techniques. Second, at the horizontal horizon, ERM 
encourages decision makers to incorporate risk knowledge in the decision process. 
Despite this recent research, there is a paucity of evidence considering ERM and firm 
performance linkages using UK data. This study is therefore motivated to fill the gap 
and extends the risk management literature from a UK perspective by testing the 
impact of ERM on firm performance. Specifically:  
 
RQ 1: Does ERM affect firm performance in the UK? 
 
Research on risk committees is currently in an evolutionary phase. For 
instance, prior research identifies that the presence of a risk committee and its 
characteristics are linked with firm risk levels and risk disclosures, as risk oversight 
is one of its main functions. Researchers find that the risk committee is negatively 
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associated with underwriting risk (Ng et al., 2013) and positively linked with market 
risk and risk information generation (Tao and Hutchinson, 2013; Hines et al., 2015; 
Al-Hadi et al., 2016). Prior research also suggests that risk committee characteristics 
are associated with firm performance but the evidence is mixed. For instance, Tao 
and Hutchinson (2013) find negative relationships, while Hoque et al. (2013) and 
Wu et al. (2016) find positive impacts of risk committee characteristics on 
performance. Deducing from the prior literature, this study expects the risk 
committee to be an important component of ERM, as Walker (2009) suggests that a 
risk committee, in addition to its risk oversight function, is also responsible for ERM. 
For instance, Walker (2009) recommends that a risk committee should define risk 
appetite and risk tolerance levels, and it is expected to provide the guidelines to, and 
oversee the functions of, the CRO. Based on this gap in the literature, this study 
anticipates that a risk committee can reasonably influence the impact of ERM on 
firm performance. Thus, this study expects that risk committee characteristics can 
strengthen or weaken the ERM impact on firm performance. This study does not 
expect unidirectional hypotheses because of the mix of theoretical and empirical 
arguments on the pros and cons of establishing a risk committee. To investigate this 
objective, the study intends to answer following research question:     
 
RQ 2. Is the effect of ERM on firm performance moderated by risk committee 
characteristics in the UK? 
 
Based on the identified literature gap and the chosen research questions, 
Figure 3.1 depicts the basic relationship between the constructs of this study. It 
shows that risk committee characteristics can influence the relationship between 
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ERM and firm performance. The theoretical basis of the relationship is discussed in 
Chapter 4, while a discussion on the selection and measurement of variables is 
provided in Chapter 5.     
 
 
Figure 3.1. Relationship between Constructs 
 
3.5. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed literature on the relationship between ERM and firm 
performance. The empirical research provides mixed evidence. Some researchers 
find that ERM is not value relevant, while others, by adopting more sophisticated 
measures of ERM, claim that it increases firm performance and also contributes 
towards shareholders’ wealth creation. Secondly, this chapter summarizes previous 
research on the topic of risk committees, particularly in relation to their formation 
and implications for risk management and firm performance. The literature presents 
mixed findings, but overall in terms of forming a risk committee, companies with 
strong corporate governance mechanisms are more oriented towards establishing a 
risk committee. Third, after discussing the literature, this study highlights the 
 57 
 
importance of risk committees in both ERM functions and firm performance. The 
chapter provides a discussion on these identified research gaps and articulates two 
research questions as follows: RQ 1: Does ERM affect firm performance in the UK? 
This research question intends to answer whether ERM has valuation implications in 
a UK setting. RQ 2: Is the effect of ERM on firm performance moderated by risk 
committee characteristics in the UK? This research question examines whether the 










Chapter 4: Theoretical Review  
4.1. Chapter Introduction 
This chapter provides a theoretical evaluation of both ERM and risk committees. 
Section 4.2 discuses the basic foundations of ERM that stem from the Modern 
Portfolio Theory (MPT) and Financial Distress Theory (FDT). Section 4.3 compares 
ERM with traditional silo-based risk management in value creation, while Section 
4.4 discusses the organizational-level benefits of ERM. The discussion up to this 
point leads to the formation of hypothesis H1 in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 discusses 
risk oversight by considering agency theory. Section 4.7 provides positive and 
negative arguments on the links between the risk committee and ERM function, 
which leads to the formation of the hypothesis H2 in Section 4.8. The chapter is 
summarized in Section 4.9.             
 
4.2. Theoretical Underpinnings of ERM 
This section provides the foundational grounds of ERM in value creation based on 
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and Financial Distress Theory (FDT). Section 4.2.1 
elaborates on how the ERM function creates value in an organization when there are 
market inefficiencies based on MPT. Based on the FDT, Section 4.2.2 discusses how 
ERM helps an organization to avoid costs related to financial distress and 
consequently creates shareholders’ wealth.  
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4.2.1. ERM and MPT 
MPT provides foundational support for ERM (Beasley, Pagach and Warr, 2008; 
Alviniussen and Jankensgard, 2009). In his seminal work in classical finance, Harry 
Markowitz explained how investors can minimize their risk for a given level of 
expected return through efficient diversification and asset allocation (Markowitz, 
1952). MPT considers securities’ risk as the volatility of expected returns around 
their means. By taking the concepts of covariance and correlation, MPT calculates 
risk in a holistic approach using the concept of co-movements between securities’ 
returns (Ballantyne, 2013). MPT relies on two important assumptions: the rationality 
of investors and fair price allocation in the market (Hillier et al., 2010).        
Following MPT, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) can estimate trade-
off between risk and return on an investment. CAPM theory was established by three 
eminent financial economists: Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964), and Lintner (1965). 
This theory states that not all risks affect securities expected return and investors do 
not need to compensate for unsystematic risks because they can be eliminated by 
creating a well-diversified portfolio. 
CAPM has various important implications. For instance, an asset’s expected 
return depends on its sensitivity to the market (i.e. systematic risk) and firm-specific 
risks are not related to the market; thus, investors cannot call for risk premium in 
excess of risk-free rates of return (Gruber and Ross, 1978; Perold, 2004). This 
implies that organizational efforts including resources or strategies such as ERM and 
formation of risk committees needed to reduce unsystematic risks will not give 
marginal benefits to investors (Ballantyne, 2013) because investors are compensated 




would have negative effects on shareholders’ wealth (Beasley et al., 2008; Pagach 
and Warr, 2011).   
MPT provides the basis from which to consider the collective risk of a 
portfolio and contribution of each asset’s risk into that portfolio. Likewise, ERM 
uses the underlying concepts of MPT beyond financial risk and considers risk 
management in a holistic style. Ballantyne (2013) discusses three main similarities 
between MPT and ERM principles:  
• Risk of a portfolio is not equal to the sum of company-level risks; 
• In order to calculate a portfolio risk, the quantification of individual risks 
and their co-variations is necessary; 
• The portfolio risk is significant for all risk decisions in a company. 
ERM follows the original roots of portfolio theory (Beasley et al., 2008) but 
it is not supported by MPT. This is due to the fact that ERM focuses on company-
specific risks and MPT argues that investors should not worry about such risks as 
they can be eliminated through efficient diversification. Pagach and Warr (2011) 
discuss that from an MPT view, in an efficient market, ERM would have negative 
effects on firm value because any efforts or expenditures, like ERM implementation, 
used to manage those risks will have a negative net present value (NPV). In 
accordance with MPT, CAPM also suggests that investors are rewarded with a 
premium for bearing systematic risk and are not concerned with unsystematic risk. 
However, the emergent literature provides evidence that the relevance of company-
specific factors is better than beta alone in predicting stock returns (Alviniussen and 
Jankensgard, 2009). These company-specific factors (such as Leverage, P/E ratio, 
book value) are given due recognition and considered to be equally value relevant for 
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investors in determining risk premium as beta or systematic risk (Ohlson, 1995; 
Chatterjee et al., 1999; Fama and French, 2004).    
Also, MPT and CAPM arguments strictly rely on the assumption of efficient 
capital markets. Beasley et al. (2008) argue that the worth of risk management (such 
as in the form of ERM or risk committees) in the value creation process become 
apparent in the presence of market frictions and information asymmetries and adds 
value through taxes (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), bankruptcy costs (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973), agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and external capital 
costs (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993).      
 
4.2.2. ERM and FDT 
As discussed by Alviniussen and Jankensgard (2009), the FDT provides another 
foundation in ERM evolution. Purnanandam (2008) defines financial distress as a 
state of “solvency” when a company faces loss due to low cash flows. Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe (2013) explain that a firm under financial distress is likely to 
default on a contract, and possibly consider financial restructuring. Usually the firm 
is forced to take actions that it would not have taken if it had sufficient cash flows. In 
a state of financial distress, a company usually faces three main types of costs: those 
relating to the fulfilment of debt obligations, losing market competition, and being 
unable to make profitable investments. As a firm under financial distress is more 
likely to be unable to meet its debt covenants (Purnanandam, 2008), creditors 
frequently enforce debt covenants such as low net worth value on the borrower or 
high debt-to-equity ratio (Kalay, 1982). Further, Smith and Stulz (1985) state that 
“the inability to meet debt covenants can result in accelerated debt repayment, 




with the lender” (Ballantyne, 2013, p. 43). A firm under financial distress is also 
likely to reduce its market competitiveness because of losing key employees, 
customers, and suppliers. Opler and Titman (1994) provide empirical evidence of 
this issue and find that highly leveraged companies experience a sales decline by 26 
percent compared to low leveraged companies during industry downturn. They 
further find a similar decline in the market value of equity. As firms usually increase 
their market value by accepting positive NPV projects, a firm under financial distress 
would be unable to do so because of unavailability of sufficient cash flow for initial 
investment and the high cost of external financing due to high risk premiums 
required by investors (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993).  
The costs arising from financial distress induce a firm to adopt an effective 
approach of risk management, such as ERM or the formation of a risk management 
committee, in order to elude the occurrence of expensive bankruptcy. As discussed 
earlier, the MPT does not suggest company-specific risk management activities 
because in an efficient market investors can diversify that risk through proper 
diversification. Thus, MPT argues against ERM as it destroys shareholders’ wealth 
because the cost of ERM activities is greater than the investors’ efficient portfolio 
creation rewards. But in the presence of market asymmetries, Smith and Stulz (1985) 
discuss the benefits of risk management in value creation for the first time. They 
argue that the chance of incurring financial distress and bankruptcy costs can be 
reduced through proper risk management. Thus, FDT provides a foundational 
support to ERM grounded on the view that bankruptcy costs destroy wealth and 
ERM helps to avoid such costs through reduction in stock price and earnings 
volatility and contributing towards higher capital efficiency (Gatzert and Martin, 
2015). The risk management literature signifies the importance of ERM in protecting 
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shareholders’ wealth by providing a company with a platform to become more 
resilient and adaptable to major events including financial distress. ERM provides an 
approach to predict unlikely events and build contingency plans, accounts for 
strategic opportunities involving better decision making, and eventually leads to 
improvement of overall business performance (Pagach and Warr, 2010; Gordon et 
al., 2009; McShane et al., 2011).  
 
4.3. Value Creation: Comparing ERM with Traditional Silo-Based Risk 
Management 
The traditional silo-based approach is regarded as a disaggregated method that 
focuses on managing risks in “silos”, while ERM is a holistic approach that 
emphasizes “enterprise-wide risk management” that involves a comprehensive 
approach to risk management including the whole organization and employees at all 
levels (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). ERM provides the basis with which to manage 
risks at multiple levels within a company and across different businesses, industries 
and sectors to achieve risk management effectiveness and performance targets.  
Under the traditional approach there is a chance of inefficiency due to 
managing risks in a task-by-task process and the resultant lack of coordination 
among various departments (McShane et al., 2011). Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003), in 
advocating ERM, state that it incorporates and integrates decision-making at all 
levels of risk sources, thus benefiting a company by avoiding risk-related costs 
through the use of natural hedges. In a traditional approach, hedging is viewed as an 
activity to reduce costs related to agency conflicts, bankruptcy, and regulatory 
scrutiny (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Hoyt and Khang, 2000). Nocco and Stulz (2006) 




improves overall company performance and shareholders’ wealth. Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2011) debate that a task-by-task approach of managing risk can reduce 
volatility from specific sources but a dynamic and holistic approach of ERM focuses 
on eliminating earnings volatility by preventing risk aggregations at all levels within 
a company.  
The silo-based risk management approach is isolated, fragmented and 
uncoordinated within a company in which risk managers manage risks in silos (task-
by-task, department-by-department) with a focus on pure risks26 and investment in 
derivatives (McShane et al., 2011). In contrast, the dynamic method of ERM widens 
its approach of risk management that not only includes “financial risks” but also 
considers operational and strategic risks as well. ERM works in a coordinated way 
and considers a wide range of risks originating from different sources including 
corporate governance, human resources, auditing, IT, supply chain, etc. The central 
idea of ERM follows a holistic approach through the accumulation of risks in a 
portfolio followed by the use of natural hedging techniques in order to reduce 
residual risk (Bowling and Rieger, 2005). This method of risk management is more 
effective and efficient comparing to the traditional silo-based approach. Following 
the concepts of MPT, the holistic approach of ERM can increase shareholders’ value 
through hedges (Chapman, 2003) because the risk of a portfolio should be less than 
the individual securities risks unless a perfect correlation exists. Table 4.1 
summarizes the major differences between ERM and traditional silo-based risk 
management.  
                                                 
 
26 “The pure risks are also known as hazard risks, which are typically insurable. These are accidental 
risks for which there is no possibility of gain, such as property and liability risks, as opposed to 
business risks, such as financial, operational, and strategic risks for which there is a possibility of 
gain” (McShane et al. 2011, p. 655).  
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Table 4.1. Major Differences between ERM and Traditional Silo-based Risk 
Management 
No. ERM Traditional Silo-based Risk Management 
1 It follows a holistic approach of 
managing risk involving all levels 
of the organization. 
It focuses on risk management in “silos” 
as a step-by-step approach.  
2 Focus is on preventing aggregation 
of risk. 
Focus is on risk prevention from specific 
sources. 
3 Exploitation of natural hedges 
through strategic focus. 
It manages risks through corporate 
insurance and financial hedging. 
4 It integrates risk management in 
organizational strategy and focuses 
on better decision making. 
Focuses on protecting organization from 
financial losses. 
5 Focuses on increasing 
shareholders’ wealth and corporate 
performance. 
This approach does not prioritize 
responsibilities of investors when 
making decisions.  
 
 
4.4. Organizational-level Benefits of ERM 
As discussed in previous sections, risk management creates value in the presence of 
market frictions. It adds value to a firm by lowering potential costs of financial 
distress in order to avoid bankruptcy. Moreover, it is argued that ERM is better than 
traditional silo-based risk management. This section progresses the discussion by 
summarizing some of the main advantages of implementing ERM to an organization 
as argued by Chapman (2011). Although there is no risk management technique that 
reduces the risk to zero, ERM can deliver effective and efficient ways to deal with a 

















The proactive and holistic approach of ERM allows an 
organization to assess and capture the opportunities it seeks 




The recent GFC eroded investors’ confidence, particularly 
regarding risk management. In turn, credit rating agencies, 
regulators and investors become more interested in learning 
about organizations’ capacity and capabilities to manage 
risks effectively. In this regard, ERM’s dynamic and holistic 
approach defines a rigorous base of managing risks and thus 
endorsing investors’ confidence. 
3 Regulatory 
obligations  
The adoption of ERM and its subsequent monitoring would 
require a company to keep itself up-to-date regarding risk 
management requirements. It also assures a board that the 




The ERM approach helps to align business strategy with risk 
appetite by evaluating the strategic alternatives within the 
limits of downside risk and protects a company against 
tapping into “lower-tail earnings”27 outcomes which can 
result in severe losses (Stulz, 1996). 
5 Corporate 
governance 
The ERM approach enhances corporate governance 
effectiveness by limiting excessive risk taking, increasing 
board of directors’ engagement, and improving the decision 
quality regarding risk appetite and risk tolerance.   
6 Risk 
management 
The ERM approach works as an enterprise-wide risk 
management thus integrating risk management throughout 
the organization. Instead of being an entirely defensive risk 
approach, ERM maximizes opportunities by integrating risk 
reporting, risk transfer strategies, and managing risk into 
business processes. This approach can capture risks arising 
from any level of the organization. For instance, any breach 
the business conducts at board-level or any non-compliance 
of environmental act at production level.  
 
4.5. Impact of ERM on Firm Performance 
Discussions proceeding from the previous sections highlight that the implementation 
of an effective ERM should result in higher firm performance. ERM consists of 
methods and processes through which organizations manage risks and capture 
                                                 
 
27 Under a standard normal distribution, a “low-tail earnings” is an event that occurs at the lower tail 
with a probability less than 3σ (Moyer, et al. 2011).   
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opportunities consistent with their strategic objectives. It assists the board of 
directors by ensuring that management is actively identifying and evaluating risks 
through standardized processes, that help in making informed decisions. Brown et al. 
(2009) discuss that effective ERM processes will result in ensuring fewer surprises, 
assisting management and exploitation of opportunities, enhancing information 
processing and communication, increasing firm reputation, enhancing organizational 
stature of accountability, assurance and governance, and contribute to overall 
planning and firm performance. They further discuss that an ERM approach should 
encourage disclosures of risk related issues to the board of directors, which in turn 
promotes transparency and better management of the business.      
ERM can deliver benefits to an organization by reducing volatility of 
earnings and equity prices, increasing investment efficiency, and creating synergy 
and coordination in the overall risk management process. In this light, Liebenberg 
and Hoyt (2003) argue that the use of ERM increases board decision-making ability 
that results in improved strategy, effective operations, decreased costs, and positive 
cash flows. Moreover, Nocco and Stulz (2006) discuss the macro and micro level 
benefits of ERM. At the macro level, ERM creates value by focusing on the 
quantification and management of risk-return trade-offs faced by an organization, 
which assists market accessibility and other resources for corporate strategy. At the 
micro level, ERM ensures that decision-making is not centralised among top 
managers, but it is instead spread throughout the organization at all levels and that 
every unit evaluate risk in its decision-making processes. Among these benefits, the 
literature also highlights that a successful ERM program can contribute to firm 
performance through improved governance and efficient chain of command 




However, ERM has also been criticised regarding its ability to manage risks. 
Rasmussen (2007) argues that the COSO ERM framework lacks the external context 
of risk management and considers the “risk” as an internal dynamic that is not 
affected by the external environment. Further, the ERM approach extensively 
focuses on identifying threats and hazards. Rasmussen (2007) states that threat 
evaluation is only one part of risk management, and that it should also consist of 
opportunity analysis. The empirical research is not consistent and provides mixed 
evidence regarding this linkage (for instance: Beasley et al., 2008; Gordon et al., 
2009; Wen and Yu, 2012; Baxter et al., 2013). However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, prior research was limited in terms of measuring the ERM activity (such as 
using a dummy variable or conducting a univariate analysis on pre-post adoption of 
ERM). This study accepts the positive outcome of ERM activity in an organization 
and tests the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: ERM significantly and positively affects firm performance.   
 
4.6. ERM Oversight: Agency Theory Perspective 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is a dominant paradigm in corporate 
governance research for the investigation and justification of the impacts of board 
structures, composition, and roles (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory is based on the 
“principal problem” and is linked with resolving potential conflicts between 
principals (owners, shareholders, investors) and agents (managers) (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). In this light, two main conflicts are noted. 
The first arises when there is a mismatch between the interests of owners and 
managers, given that managers are not perfectly honest or aligned to the interest of 
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principals. Eisenhardt (1989) discusses that this conflict becomes more intense when 
the principals are unable to examine or oversee the suitability of the actions of 
managers, that is, whether they are properly matched with organizational objectives. 
The second conflict arises when discrepancies exist between owners and managers 
regarding the amount of risk undertaken by management. This leads to different 
attitudes towards risk preference and consequently affects strategic decisions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).   
Research to date provides evidence on the links between agency theory and 
risk management (Tufano, 1998). In addition, research discusses the agency costs 
that arise a result of conflicts between owners, managers, and debt providers (Leland, 
1998; Hemrit and Arab, 2011). Investors normally delegate their decision-making 
power to managers and expect them to carry out duties that are aligned with the 
interests of the investors (Cotter, Lokman and Najah, 2011).28 Since managers 
possess more knowledge and skills compared to shareholders, they are expected to 
pursue firm decisions that are aligned with their own personal motives but at the 
expense of owners (Padilla, 2002).29 With this concern, the principals are likely to 
execute effective monitoring mechanisms to determine how the managers are 
discharging their responsibilities, which may mislead the managers and in turn 
increase the agency costs (Shapiro, 2005).30  
                                                 
 
28 Grant (2003) discusses that the best interest of investors (principals) is the maximization of value 
(share price), whereas the main focus of managers (agents) is the expansion or growth of the 
organization.  
29 Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss that managers have the potential to maximize their benefits due 
to the separation of ownership and control. Hart (1995) argues that this conflict of interest may worsen 
when the shareholders (principals) are unable to carry out an effective monitoring function due to their 
dispersion or lack of incentives.   
30 Monitoring mechanisms of principals generally involve shareholders’ engagement, incentive 
schemes or rewards systems, and contracts for agents (Solomon, 2007). However, Hemrit and Arab 
(2011) argue that such actions from the principals become unfavorable due to inherent information 





Effective corporate governance mechanisms can overcome the problems 
related to the separation of ownership and control, and thus reduce agency costs. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) view corporate governance as a monitoring mechanism31 
that mitigates chances of potential conflict of interests between principal and agents, 
and ultimately reduces agency costs. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) identify that the 
prime objective of corporate governance through internal monitoring and advising is 
to promote management to work in the best interest of shareholders, such as via 
investments in positive net present value. However, if the governance structure is 
deemed weak, then the agency issues are likely to increase (Jensen, 2001). Therefore, 
agency theory aims to determine a cost-effective governance structure to mitigate 
agency problems (Dey, 2008).     
In risk management, agency theory suggests that the monitoring and advising 
roles of the board of directors in corporate governance should ensure that proficient 
risk oversight processes are in place to help an organization effectively identify, 
evaluate, prioritise, and manage principal risks in ERM processes (Fama, 1980; 
Caldwell, 2012). The board of directors ensures an appropriate “tone at the top” that 
leads to more informed risk-taking decisions, thus contributing to shareholders’ 
wealth creation. Therefore, it can be expected that the involvement of the board of 
directors in the risk oversight function may contribute to risk management maturity, 
leading to decisions that decrease volatility of earnings and stock prices (Ittner and 
Keusch, 2015). In Chapter 2, Section 2.4, it has been discussed that a board of 
directors has full responsibility of risk management of the company; however, the 
                                                 
 
31 In an organization, a board of directors is a primary device for internal monitoring while an external 
auditor works as an external monitoring mechanism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Baiman, 1990). For 
better quality of internal monitoring and to lower opportunistic managerial behaviour a board expands 
its monitoring function by forming board-level committees (Subramaniam, 2006). 
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board can delegate this function to a board-level committee. The committee on 
behalf of the board supports its ERM monitoring and oversight functions 
(Subramaniam et al., 2009; Sekome and Lemma, 2014). The following section 
discusses how the risk committee can influence ERM processes through its oversight 
function. Further, in light of the agency theory, the possible influential factors 
relating to the structure and composition of the risk committee are discussed in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3. 
 
4.7. Role of the Risk Committee in ERM Oversight  
A board of directors has ultimate responsibility for ERM but it can delegate its risk 
oversight function to a board-level committee that is expected to oversee the 
functions of the overall risk management program and advice the board regarding its 
performance and efficacy. In this section, discussion of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of board-level risk committees in relation to their link with the ERM 
function is presented.  
In ERM, the main function of a risk committee is to assist the board of 
directors in risk oversight, fostering risk management, and to improve the quality of 
risk reporting and monitoring (COSO, 2009; Baxter et al., 2013). Traditionally, the 
audit committee is charged with risk management activities (FRC, 2010; 2012) that 
extend up to risk identification, evaluation, management, and control (Ng, Chong and 
Ismail, 2012). But this trust has been challenged after the series of corporate 
collapses in the early 2000s and especially after the recent GFC that cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of the audit committee in ERM oversight (Bates and Leclerc, 2009). 




Table 4.3 shows some examples of the risk committees of UK FTSE-350 listed 
companies on reporting ERM responsibility in their annual reports.   
 
Table 4.3. Examples of Risk Committees in UK FTSE-350 Reporting ERM 
Responsibility 





“Reviewed and approved the Enterprise-wide Risk 
Management (“ERM”) strategy and framework 





“The purpose of the Board Risk Committee is to 
monitor the Group’s compliance with the Board’s 
approved risk appetite, risk management 
framework and risk culture” (p. 95). 




“The Committee also considered management’s 
plans to deliver a holistic Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) framework, intended to 
deliver an increase in effectiveness and make risk 






“The Committee’s role is to exercise oversight on 
behalf of the Board of Group enterprise-wide risk, 
and to provide assurance to the Board that the 
overall framework for complying with the Risk 
Management Principles and Risk Tolerance 
Statement is operating effectively” (p. 157). 
Petrofac Report, 
2013 
“Assures itself of the effectiveness of the 
Enterprise Risk Management Framework” (p. 86).  
 
The significance of a risk committee in the ERM process has received 
attention in the literature. Initially, KPMG (2001) describes the risk committee as a 
board-level committee that elaborates the board about ERM processes, makes 
necessary recommendations on risk appetite, risk tolerance, and risk strategy, 
acknowledges the risk oversight ownership, and reviews organization’s risk reports. 
In recent literature, it is considered as an integral component of ERM, providing the 
risk department with a holistic view and understanding of firm operations, helping to 
foster a corporate culture towards risk reporting and monitoring, and provides a 
critical resource in meeting ERM responsibilities (Subramaniam et al., 2009).  
 74 Chapter 4: Theoretical Review 
However, beside the advantages there are some opposing arguments 
regarding the oversight function of risk committees. Eggleston and Ware (2009) 
argue that a board-level risk committee can adversely affect the full board by 
weakening its capacity to fully incorporate the risk assessment processes into the 
monitoring of business strategy and operations. Also, it adds an additional 
bureaucratic layer to the risk oversight process, causing non-committee board 
members to lose their focus and creates misunderstanding about the boundaries of 
risk oversight with other board-level committees (Bates and Leclerc, 2009). Protiviti 
(2011) suggests that a risk committee is not a panacea and it can result in various 
adverse outcomes in ERM because of redundant activities and dilution of the board’s 
focus on risk oversight. Further, Protiviti (2011) argues that without a proper 
monitoring structure, a risk committee will lack effectiveness. In the light of 
opposing arguments on risk committees, it can be expected that their structure and 
composition could negatively affect the firm performance implications of ERM. 
Table 4.4 summarizes a discussion by Libit and Freier (2016) on the pros and cons of 















Table 4.4. Pros and Cons of a Risk Committee in ERM 
No. Pros Cons 
1 Beneficial for overall risk 
governance if quantity and 
complexity of principal risks 
increase.  
Not necessary if an existing board-level 
committee is sufficiently performing risk 
oversight function.  
2 Exclusive emphasis on principal 
risks and boosts coordination 
regarding ERM. 
Dilute overall board’s focus on ERM. 
3 Supports management that is 
responsible for risk management. 
As a board-level committee, it will 
consume board resources, and increase 
organizational costs. 
4 Aids in on-going review of ERM. Not always compatible for all types of 
industry-specific risks (for instance: health 
and safety, IT, environmental etc.) which 
requires a separate committee. 
5 Relief to audit committee on risk 
oversight responsibility. 
Unnecessary replication of risk oversight 
creates inefficiencies.   
6 Boost investors and other 
stakeholders’ confidence 
regarding the board’s 
commitment to managing risks. 
Some organizational specific risks such as 
relating to corporate strategy are best to 
overseen by the board only. 
 
4.8. Impact of the Risk Committee on the Effectiveness of ERM 
With reference to the discussion in previous sections, it should be noted that the risk 
committee plays a key oversight role in ERM. It provides assurance that the 
organization is adhering to the effective and efficient risk management practices at 
all levels (Bugalla et al. 2012). The risk committee has a direct responsibility for 
making recommendations to the board of directors on ERM processes that are not 
limited to only financial risks but also include the oversight of the policies and 
procedures on strategic, operational, and compliance risks (COSO, 2004). RIMS 
(2015) identifies the “risk committee” as an integral component of an ERM program 
which provides the risk department with a holistic view and understanding of the 
firm’s operations. It bridges the operational gaps in ERM processes by establishing 
direct connections with employees at various levels in a company in order to gain 
deeper understanding of impending opportunities and threats. In addition, Choi 
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(2013) states that the risk committee is responsible for developing annual ERM 
strategy and that it can add value to the organization by elevating the risk oversight 
function to the highest level, by promoting risk awareness culture, monitoring the 
excessive risk-taking behaviour, and improving risk communication across different 
organizational levels.  
In light of the above discussion, this study expects that the risk committee can 
influence or moderate the overall effectiveness of the ERM function, and 
consequently affect its performance outcomes. The moderating effects of the risk 
committee are tested through its characteristics, as the structure and composition are 
important elements for the risk oversight function (Deloitte, 2014). However, the 
study does not anticipate any unidirectional relationship because of the mixed 
outcomes of the literature that identifies both advantages and disadvantages of risk 
committee existence (as discussed in the prior section) and articulates the following 
hypotheses in order to test the moderation impacts of a number of risk committee 
characteristics on the relationship between ERM and firm performance:   
 
H2a: The risk committee significantly affects firm performance. 
H2b: The effect of ERM on firm performance is significantly moderated by the risk 
committee characteristics.   
 
4.9. Chapter Summary 
This chapter firstly discussed the theoretical underpinnings of ERM through MPT 
and FDT. In particular, the MPT does not support the ERM function because it states 
that investors can successfully negate the firm-specific risk through efficient 
diversification and any activity that a firm performs in order to reduce its 




the concept of MPT heavily relies on perfect market assumptions, such as rationality 
of investors and fair price allocation. In the real world, these assumptions are mostly 
not met which increases the importance of ERM. Further, the FDT provides another 
foundation for ERM. Firms benefit from ERM in order to avoid the negative 
consequences of financial distress. Second, after realizing the theoretical worth of 
ERM, the chapter then provides a comparison between ERM and traditional silo-
based risk management in firm value creation. It is argued that ERM is a better 
approach as it focuses on managing risks at multiple levels, uses natural hedges that 
contribute towards shareholders’ wealth, and prevents aggregation of risks that 
ultimately enhance firm performance. Third, based on the previous argument on 
ERM, the chapter presents organizational-level benefits of implementing ERM. In 
general, it has been discussed that an ERM program is beneficial to meet strategic 
objectives, to boost shareholders’ confidence and wealth, to enhance corporate 
governance mechanisms, and to manage risk efficiently and effectively. This led to 
the development of the first hypothesis (H1) of this study. Fourth, the chapter 
discusses ERM oversight in light of agency theory, followed by an examination of 
the positive and negative roles of risk committees in an ERM function. It is 
postulated that a risk committee can deliver ERM education at board-level, develop 
risk appetite and risk strategy, and foster a corporate risk culture. However, on the 
other hand it can impair risk effectiveness by adding an additional bureaucratic layer 
of risk oversight, creating confusion among other board committees regarding risk 
oversight boundaries, and redundant activities of risk management can be costly to 
the firm. This discussion led to the development of the second hypothesis (H2a and 





Chapter 5: Research Design 
“Beware of testing too many hypotheses; the more you torture the data, the more 
likely they are to confess, but confession obtained under duress may not be 
admissible in the court of scientific opinion” – Stigler (1987, p. 148). 
 
5.1. Chapter Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research methods employed in this study. Section 5.2 
discusses how the current study fits within the positivist research paradigm in order 
to investigate the research questions developed from the literature review. Section 
5.3 explains the conceptualization of the adoption of the risk committee concept. 
Section 5.4 presents a detailed discussion on selection and measurement of the 
variables for statistical testing. A discussion of the statistical analysis methods to be 
applied and techniques for robustness are presented in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 
provides the basis for sample selection and the data collection procedures. This 
section provides rationale for selecting the target population of FTSE-350, sampling 
frame, and the various sources of secondary data for this study. Section 5.7 provides 
a summary of the research design.        
 
5.2. Research Paradigm 
This study falls under the domain of accounting and governance research, which 
stems from an ontologically objective and epistemology perspective focusing only on 
observable phenomena and credible facts. Therefore, this study fits into the 
positivistic research paradigm. The positivism philosophy was initially augmented by 
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French Philosopher August Comte who argued that the best way of understanding 
human behaviour is the use of observation and reasoning (Ferré, 1988). At an 
ontological horizon, the positivist view is that nature’s reality is objective, external 
and independent of human thoughts. Positive researchers are oriented towards 
knowledge generation that is reliable and constitutes scientific methods and 
quantification to enhance the accuracy of the explanation of parameters and 
relationships among them (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). Gill and Johnson 
(2002) state that research undertaken in the positivist paradigm relies heavily on 
highly structured methodology leading towards statistical analysis and hypothesis 
testing that also aids replication. 
In their seminal work, Watts and Zimmerman (1978; 1983) by adopting 
“positive research” from economics (Friedman, 1953) popularized “Positive 
Accounting Theory” which deals with “what is actually happening” and seeks to 
explain and predict a phenomenon. Further, Watts and Zimmerman (1983) 
emphasize that the original focus of accounting and governance research supports 
positivism. They argue that it should maintain traditional methods of quantitative 
investigations through hypothesis formation and testing, which is essential for good 
research. Moreover, Dollery and Jackson (1994) also support the credibility of 
accounting research based on the positivist approach and the use of quantitative 
methods. Accordingly, this study adopts a positivist research paradigm to investigate 








5.3. Conceptualization of the Adoption of the Risk Committee Concept  
Following Subramaniam et al. (2009), this study conceptualizes the existence of a 
risk committee in the following ways:32 
• Audit and risk committee (ARC). A committee of the board of directors that 
discloses its existence in the annual report as a combined audit and risk 
committee. 
• Standalone risk committee (SRC). A committee of the board of directors that 
discloses its existence in the annual report as a risk committee separate from 
the audit committee or other board-level committees. 
 
Subramaniam et al. (2009) discuss that the presence of a risk committee is 
likely to increase the actual and perceived quality of internal monitoring of risk 
management. They further argue that this expected risk monitoring will be higher 
when there is a SRC instead of an ARC. They provide the following arguments to 
support their rationalizations. First, the quality of monitoring of risk management is 
possibly higher in the case of a SRC, as this structure allows committee members to 
give their full attention to reviewing risk processes and risk reports, and consequently 
should result in better quality internal monitoring. Second, based on the signalling 
effects of board committees to earn corporate legitimacy (Harrison, 1987), the 
formation of a SRC would reflect a strong commitment to risk monitoring when 
compared to an ARC.  
This study recognizes the potential advantages of the adoption of risk 
committees but also realizes the negative consequences specifically related to the 
                                                 
 
32 In addition, please review Sections 2.4 and 2.5, arguing that both ARC and SRC are responsible for 
oversight of the ERM processes.    
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formation of SRCs. As discussed in Chapter 4, the SRC could negatively affect board 
effectiveness with regard to the overall risk management system by impairing the 
board’s ability to fully integrate risk assessment processes into their monitoring of 
risk management strategies and operations (Eggleston and Ware, 2009). Moreover, 
adding an additional bureaucratic layer to the risk oversight process can hamper the 
non-committee board members, causing them to lose their focus and create confusion 
regarding the boundaries of risk management with other board-level committees 
(Bates and Leclerc, 2009). Furthermore, redundant activities in risk management and 
dilution of the board’s focus on risk oversight may form a further disadvantage of 
forming a SRC (Protiviti, 2011).  
 
5.4. Variables of the Study: Selection and Measurement 
Based on the theoretical relationships and hypotheses developed in the previous 
chapter, this section discusses the selection and measurement of variables for the 
purpose of statistical testing. A description of variables is provided in Table 5.1.  
 
5.4.1. Dependent Variable – Firm Performance 
Based on the theoretical arguments that ERM is a value relevant program, previous 
studies have employed different measures to test performance and valuation 
implications of ERM, and yielding mixed results. Earlier research that used abnormal 
returns and earnings volatility failed to establish evidence that ERM has value 
addition implications (Pagach and Warr, 2010). The major limitation of these studies 
is the focus on capturing immediate market response, when the advantages of ERM 
implementation may not be evident in the short term (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011). A 




since it reveals the future expectation of investors and reflects long-term firm 
performance. Despite this change in measurement approach, the evidence from the 
literature has not been consistent. Studies that reveal a positive influence of ERM on 
Tobin’s Q conclude that ERM increases shareholders’ wealth by at-least 20% (such 
as Hoyt, and Liebenberg, 2011); it is positively associated with value during the 
rebound period after the GFC (Baxter et al., 2013); and a highly mature ERM 
program is associated with superior market value (Farrell and Gallagher, 2015); and 
engages top-down executive engagement. However, some studies also find that ERM 
is not value relevant or is strongly negatively associated with market value measured 
by Tobin’s Q (McShane et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2012).  
This study uses Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value based on the following 
grounds. It has been extensively used in risk management research (such as Smithson 
and Simkins, 2005) as it provides a future-oriented view of firm performance. 
Moreover, it is not sensitive to managerial manipulation and does not require any 
risk adjustments or standardization (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; Hoyt and 
Liebenberg, 2011). Tobin’s Q is adopted as the proxy for firm performance. For this 
study, the Tobin’s Q ratio is most suitable as it focuses on capturing future 
expectations of the shareholders and long-term performance rather than emphasizing 
historical performance. This is consistent with notation of ERM adoption that its 
benefits become apparent in the long term. This study measures Tobin’s Q ratio as 
market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by book value of assets 
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5.4.2. Independent Variables  
5.4.2.1. ERM 
Multiple measures have been employed by previous researcher to proxy ERM 
processes. For instance, some studies have relied upon keyword searching (such as: 
enterprise risk management, chief risk officer, risk committee) to test pre-post effects 
of ERM adoption (such as Beasley et al., 2008; Pagach and Warr, 2010) or to 
quantify the presence of the ERM process in the form of a dummy variable (such as 
Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Lin et al., 2012; Lechner and Gatzert, 2016). Other 
researchers have used more sophisticated measures to account for the magnitude of 
ERM adoption, such as S&P ERM Ratings (McShane et al., 2011; Baxter et al., 
2013) or RIMS ERM Maturity Levels (Farrell and Gallagher, 2015). Since this is a 
UK based study and no ERM ratings of FTSE-350 index companies are yet 
available, this study adopts an ERM index developed by Gordon et al. (2009). This 
Index consists of two independent measures of each of the four COSO ERM33 
objectives (COSO, 2004) and sums up all eight individual constructs into one metric 
that quantitatively reflects the effectiveness of a company’s ERM program. There are 
certain advantages of using this index in this study. First, the raw material for the 
index is financial variables, which make it easily replicable in any study setting. 
Second, the risk management models of sample companies in this study are more 
focused towards COSO’s (2004) ERM components. Finally, the COSO (2004) ERM 
framework itself provides the basis against which different ERM programs can be 
evaluated (Bowling and Rieger, 2005). The internal structure and components of the 
Gordon et al. (2009) ERM Index are elaborated on and discussed in Appendix A. 
                                                 
 
33 Four objectives are: high-level and aligned strategy; effective and efficient operations; reliable 




5.4.2.2. Risk Committee Characteristics 
This study considers several risk committee characteristics relating to its structure 
and composition in order to test moderating impacts on the relationship between 
ERM and firm performance. For this purpose, the variables were converted into 
standard scores in order to reduce the potential threat of multi-collinearity in 
moderation analyses. This section discusses the selection and measurement of risk 
committee characteristics.    
 
• Risk Committee Size  
Risk committee size is used as a proxy for a company’s willingness to invest board 
resources in order to increase enterprise stature and influence of the committee. 
Bédard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) state that a large committee not only provides 
strength, but the corresponding diversity of opinion within a committee makes it 
more effective in resolving potential issues. Ng et al. (2013) also argue that a large 
number of members in a risk committee enhance ERM functions. However, the 
literature also identifies some negative consequences of large committees. Large 
committees can raise a free rider problem (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) as the 
presence of more members tends to comfort the others, and the committee will tend 
to lose focus and become less efficient (Dalton et al., 1999). In this study, risk 
committee size is measured as the total number of members of the risk committee in 
absolute terms. The data for this variable is hand collected from the corporate 
governance section of annual reports.  
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• Risk Committee Meetings 
Risk committee meeting frequency is commonly used as a proxy for diligence, while 
an inactive committee causes ineffectiveness and deterioration of the committee and 
the full board. Prior research confirms meeting frequency of a committee as an 
indication of efforts to achieve its objectives, willingness of the committee members 
to fulfil their responsibilities in order to support an effective monitoring for decision 
making (Menon and Williams, 1994; Abbott and Parker, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; 
Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). More prominently, risk management is an ongoing 
process that requires risk committee attention on a regular basis and subsequent 
reporting to the board. Thus, higher meeting frequency should increase the 
committee’s ability to keep itself up to date about developments in ERM. This is a 
continuous variable in this study and is measured as the total number of risk 
committee meetings held in each financial year. The data is hand collected from the 
corporate governance section of annual reports.     
 
• Risk Committee Financial Experts 
Financial expertise and experience of board members has received significant 
attention in the corporate governance literature. Researchers find positive effects of 
the presence of financial expertise on financial reporting quality and firm value. 
Bédard et al. (2004) state that the existence of at-least one financial expert is 
negatively related with hostile earnings management decreases the company’s risk of 
failure and positively contributes towards shareholders’ wealth creation (Gordon et 
al., 2009). While reporting reliability is one of the four main pillar of COSO’s (2004) 
ERM framework, McDaniel, Martin and Maines (2002) argue that financial literates 




linked with a lower probability of firms experiencing financial reporting restatements 
(Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). In the UK, the addition of a 
financial expert in the audit committee is a requirement (FRC, 2012; 2014) but there 
is (as yet) no legal or regulatory check for a risk committee. However, the Walker 
report suggests that a risk committee should have at-least one financial expert with 
sufficient relevant experience to make discussions with the executive team and 
contribute to the principal risk issues within the boundaries of ERM (Walker, 2009).  
To measure risk committee financial expertise, this study adopts the 
definition of a financial expert as provided by the FRC for audit committees. The 
FRC (2012) guidance states that financial experts should have a professional 
qualification (in accounting or finance) and are generally required to have sufficient 
experience in corporate financial matters. The risk committee financial experts 
variable is measured as the number of committee members with this definition of 
financial expertise in the risk committee. The data is collected from the corporate 
governance section of annual reports, as this section also provides biographical 
information of each member of the board’s committee.  
 
• Risk Committee Independence -/- Non-Executives 
The composition of the board of directors is an important element of monitoring. 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) postulates that at higher number of non-
executive -/- independent directors will be associated with greater monitoring will 
also and inhibit managers from pursing their self-interests (such as fraudulent 
reporting or information concealing). Higher levels of monitoring are also linked 
with lower agency costs (such as external audit), which in turn increases firm profits. 
The audit committee literature suggests that firms benefit from independent -/- non-
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executive directors via lower chances of false reporting, and less influence of 
management (Abbot et al., 2004; Mangena and Pike, 2005). In the context of the risk 
committee, Protiviti (2011) highlights that the addition of independent -/- non-
executive directors is a requirement for building objective communication with a 
company’s managers and officers in charge of ERM activities. Ng et al. (2013) also 
claims that an independent assessment of key risk areas in a timely manner could 
minimize exposure to substantial risks. Further, the Walker (2009) report emphasizes 
the independence of the ERM function by requiring an independent CRO who works 
under the guidance provided by the risk committee on risk tolerance and risk appetite 
(Walker, 2009). This study considers risk committee independence and non-
executive directors separately as suggested by Nicholson and Kiel (2007) in that the 
two terms should not be considered identical.  
This study tests the impact of independent and non-executive directors 
separately. The variables are measured as the number of independent / non-executive 
directors in the risk committee and this data is collected from the corporate 
governance section of annual reports. 
 
• Risk Committee Overlapping 
Since ERM requires a holistic and comprehensive approach to risk management 
(COSO, 2004; Beasley and Frigo, 2007), Bates and Leclerc (2009) indicate “cross-
committee synergies” as one of the benefits of the risk committee in overall risk 
governance. They argue that overlapping memberships may reduce the chance of 
risks “slipping through the cracks” and act as a coordinator with other board-level 
committees. Therefore, a risk committee can create risk management synergies by 




a positive influence on risk and firm performance when separate risk and 
compensation committees overlap. Choi (2013) points out two problems with setting 
up a risk committee. First, role conflicts can create frictions when risk governance 
responsibilities are attached to more than one board committee, and secondly, the 
divergence of overall risk governance may occur if risks are overseen by various 
committees. In these cases, cross-committee memberships can provide benefits by 
fostering role clarity and preventing duplication of duties. Chandar, Chang and 
Zheng (2012) examine the monitoring effectiveness of audit committee members 
regarding compensation related earnings and management incentives and find that 
companies with higher levels of overlap between separate audit and compensation 
committees reflect higher financial reporting quality. They further argue that the 
overlapping memberships between board committees is beneficial as it can enhance 
the anticipation of potential behaviours of income smoothing, provide incentives to 
untangle opportunistic accounting choices, and also help to reduce information 
asymmetry between the board of directors and management. However, despite these 
positive arguments, Laux and Laux (2009) point out that it can be very demanding 
and possibly lead to the dilution of efforts and diffusion of duties. Risk committee 
overlap is measured as the number of members in the risk committee that hold 
memberships in other board-level committees. Data is collected from the corporate 
governance section, especially reporting by the board committees in the annual 
reports.  
 
• Risk Committee Female Members 
In the corporate governance literature, evidence supports the favourable arguments 
regarding female representation on the board and its outcomes on risk management 
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and firm performance (such as Powell and Ansic, 1997; Dwyer, Gilkeson and List, 
2002; Francoeur, Labelle and Sinclair-Desgagné, 2008; Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2011; 
Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Previous research argues that gender diversity in board 
committees can bring various benefits to the overall governance mechanisms 
compared to “all-male” board members. Groom (2009) argues that female 
representation encourages effective communication that in turns improves overall 
monitoring capability of the board. In opposition to “group thinking” which is 
common in male dominant boards, FRC highlights the importance of diversity 
(including gender) by stating: “Essential to the effective functioning of any board is 
dialogue which is both constructive and challenging. The problems arising from 
‘groupthink’ have been exposed in particular as a result of the financial crisis. One of 
the ways in which constructive debate can be encouraged is through having sufficient 
diversity on the board. This includes, but is not limited to, gender and race. Diverse 
board composition in these respects is not on its own a guarantee. Diversity is as 
much about differences of approach and experience, and it is very important in 
ensuring effective engagement with key stakeholders and in order to deliver the 
business strategy” (FRC, 2014 p. 2). 
Unlike ‘old-boy’ networks (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), women on boards are 
likely to increase earnings quality through increased oversight, diligence in 
monitoring and transparent reporting. Moreover, in comparison to male dominant 
boards, a higher percentage of women on the board is also linked to the development 
of female employees at lower-levels as they consider women in top management as 
role models and as a source of inspiration (Ely, 1990). Furthermore, the literature 
suggests that women have lower tolerance when compared to men in terms of 




management and excessive risk taking (Powell and Ansic, 1997; Dwyer et al., 2002). 
Finally, a higher level of gender diversity on the board also acts as a positive signal 
to the company’s external environment, including its stakeholders (Rose, 2007; 
Lückerath-Rovers, 2013) as a measure of independence and transparent decision 
making.  
In this study, the female representation is measured as the number of female 
members in the risk committee in absolute terms. The data is collected from the 
corporate governance section of annual reports. 
 
• Non-Board Level Risk Committees 
The literature mainly focuses on board-level risk committees that are beginning to 
emerge after the destructive outcomes of the recent GFC. Before the development of 
board-level risk committees, companies mostly relied on separate risk management 
units called an executive risk committee, a managerial risk committee or sometimes 
further divided into subcommittees like an operational risk committee, financial risk 
committee, and underwriting risk committee. A non-board risk committee performs 
functions that are similar to a board-level risk committee for instance considering 
principal and residual risks, and mitigation plans and actions thereof. However, a 
non-board risk committee is very different from a board-level risk committee in 
terms of its overall structure and composition. As suggested by Adams and Mehran 
(2008), the number of committees is likely to negatively associate with firm 
performance because of high operational costs and problems of communication and 
coordination. In this study, this variable is measured as the number of non-board 
level risk committees, including at executive and/or management levels. The data is 
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collected from the risk management section of annual reports that describes the 
duties and roles of corporate risk management at various levels.    
 
• Risk Committee Executives 
Previous research is mostly oriented toward the outcomes of independent or non-
executive directors (Shakir, 2008). However, there is a paucity of research regarding 
the consequences attached to the executive team on the board. Williamson (1985) 
argues that like non-executive directors, the executive directors also play their role in 
monitoring and maintaining the contractual bond between the owners and 
management. They are active participants in the overall governance of the firm and 
have access to all the available information regarding firm operations. It can be 
expected that an effective monitoring behaviour by executive directors will not only 
decrease information asymmetries but also contribute towards higher firm 
performance. However, in the real world, executive directors are also expected to 
align themselves with the CEO and remain loyal to his/her interests. Consequently, it 
can hamper their ability to implement efficient monitoring and result in higher 
agency costs and negative impacts on the firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Therefore, a constructive relationship is necessary among executive and non-
executive directors (FRC, 2014). This variable is measured as the number of 
executive members in the risk committee and the data is collected from the corporate 
governance section of annual reports.       
 
5.4.3. Control Variables 
In addition to the main variables, the study also uses a number of control variables. 




performance, this study controls for this effect by taking a log of total revenues as a 
proxy for firm size (Hoque et al., 2013; Ng, et al., 2013). Secondly, ample evidence 
is available on the impact of board characteristics on firm performance (such as 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Kim, 2005; Mura, 2007; O’Connell and Cramer, 
2010). Consistent with previous research in the risk committee context, this study 
controls for board size, meetings, and independence (Sekome and Lemma, 2014; 
Hine et al., 2015). The basic governance variables are measured in absolute terms as 
the number of total members of a board, number of board meetings held in a 
financial year, and the number of independent directors on the board. 
However, the study does not control for other financial variables that could 
affect the firm market value performance. This is because the ERM index used in this 
study already comprises a number of variables that reflect firm financial position and 
strength. Thus, the addition of variables relating to profitability or risk levels could 
raise the issue of potential multi-collinearity in the estimations. Please see Appendix 
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Table 5.1. Variables of the Study 
Variable Acronym Measurement Data Source 
Tobin’s Q Q Market value of equity plus book 
value of liabilities divided by book 




ERMI ERM Index (= strategy + operations 
+ reporting + compliance) adopted 









RCME Total number of risk committee 




RCEXP Total number of accounting / 




RCIND Total number of independent 




RCNEXE Total number of non-executive 




RCOL Total number of risk committee 










RCN Total number of non-board level risk 
committee (including at executive 




RCEXE Total number of executive directors 
on risk committee 
Annual Report 
Firm Size FSIZE Log of total sales / revenues DataStream 
Board Size BSIZE Total number of directors on board Annual Report 
Board Meetings BMEET Total number of board meetings in a 
financial year 
Annual Report 
Board Independence BIND Total number of independent 
directors on board. 
Annual Report 
Note: All the independent and control variables were converted into standard scores in order to reduce the 
potential threat of multi-collinearity in moderated regression analyses. 
 
5.5. Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis involves both descriptive and inferential techniques. First, a 
range of descriptive measures is calculated for each variable, including arithmetic 
mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. This is followed by a 
correlational analysis by computing the bivariate Pearson correlation coefficient 




regression analysis. For this purpose, all independent variables were standardized in 
order to reduce the potential issue of multi-collinearity in moderated regression 
analysis. The following equation depicts the variables that are estimated by using 
both pooled ordinary least square (OLS) and least square dummy variable (LSDV) 
techniques:  
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛿 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛺 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  (𝛶 +  𝜈) +  𝜇𝑖𝑡  
 
Where; 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the proxy for firm performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q for each firm i at time t, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the matrix of the 
controlled variables that include firm size and board characteristics for each firm i at 
time t, 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the matrix of main independent variables which include 
ERMI and risk committee characteristics for each firm i at time t, 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the matrix of interaction terms (i.e. ERMI*Risk 
Committee Characteristics) for each firm i at time t, 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the regression residuals, 
𝛼0 is the constant term, and 𝛿, 𝛽, and 𝛺 are the vectors of coefficient estimates. The 
variables in the main effects are mean differenced to reduce the potential threat of 
multicollinearity with the interaction terms. Further, the terms (𝛶 +  𝜈) in the above 
equation represents industry and time specific effects, respectively, which are 
controlled in LSDV estimations.    
 
5.5.1. Tests of Robustness 
To achieve robustness various techniques are employed. First, the study uses number 
of risk committee characteristics. This allows investigation of the impact of each 
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partial regression coefficient by controlling the effects of other coefficients of 
structure and composition of the risk committee. Second, various techniques are 
employed in order to address the issues relating to multi-collinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, and endogeneity in regression estimations. Third, the dependent 
variable for firm performance is replaced by price-to-book (P/E) ratio to determine 
whether it increases the reliability of overall findings. Fourth, in order to support the 
findings specifically related to RQ1, the study tests the significant differences in 
performance measures between ERM and non-ERM based firms. Finally, to give 
strength to the findings related to RQ2, regression estimation is performed for ERM-
based firms with and without a risk committee. A dummy variable is used to 
distinguish the effect of the presence and absence of risk committees. This analysis is 
further strengthened by comparing the ERM regression coefficients of firms with and 
without risk committees by using the following Clogg, Petkova and Haritou (1995) 
test of the equality of regression coefficients:  
𝑧 =
𝛽1 −  𝛽2
√𝑆𝐸𝛽1
2 +  𝑆𝐸𝛽2
2
 
In the above equation, 𝛽1 represents the ERM regression coefficient extracted 
from the sample without a risk committee, 𝛽2 is the ERM regression coefficient from 
the sample having a risk committee, and 𝑆𝐸𝛽 represents the standard error of the beta 









Table 5.2. Variables Used in Robustness Tests 
Variable Acronym Measurement Data Source 
Price-to-Book Ratio P/B Share price at the end of financial year 
divided by book value per share 
DataStream 
Earnings per Share EPS Net profit after tax divided by number 
of common shares outstanding 
DataStream 





DRC 1 if a firm has a board-level risk 
committee otherwise 0 
Annual Report 
 
5.6. Sampling and Data Collection 
Over the past 15 years, significant developments in the UK’s corporate governance 
regulations and mechanisms have been documented including (Smith, 2003; Higgs, 
2003; FRC, 2003; FRC, 2006; Walker, 2009; FRC, 2010; FRC, 2014). After the 
effects of the GFC, the Walker (2009) report recommended the creation of risk 
committees’ in FTSE-100 listed banks and other financial institutions. Despite the 
lack of formal recommendation, from 2011 companies in the FTSE-250 have also 
adopted this guidance as well. Therefore, this study examines the time period of 2012 
to 2015. The target population is FTSE-350 companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) during the study period. The FTSE-350 represents the largest 
cumulative market capitalization in the LSE and it is a centre of attention for 
investors and many regulatory bodies. On its website, the LSE provides an updated 
list of FTSE-350 constituents that are currently operating. The sampling frame has 
been reduced to only those companies with ERM processes and established board-
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5.6.1. Sample Selection 
The sample is selected in two stages. First, based on prior research, a list of 
companies that have implemented ERM processes during the study period (2012 to 
2015) is identified. This is performed by keyword searching for ERM processes34 
(including enterprise risk management, Chief Risk Officer (CRO), enterprise-wide 
risk management, risk committee, corporate risk management, integrated risk 
management, strategic risk management, and holistic risk management)35 in the 
annual reports. This approach is consistent with previous research (Beasley et al., 
2008; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2009; Gordon et al., 2009; Pagach and Warr, 2010). 
Sentences with the keywords were read to gain a better understanding of whether a 
company is actually adhering to the ERM approach or not. Moreover, this study 
compares firm performance of ERM and non-ERM firms, which indirectly also gives 
robustness to the identification process of ERM. As shown in Table 5.3, a total of 
410 firm-years was identified with an ERM activity during the study period. 
Appendix C provides some examples of the companies disclosing ERM 
implementation in their annual reports. In the second stage, those firms out of the 
total users of ERM having board-level risk committees that include a SRC or ARC 
(Subramaniam et al., 2009) during the study period. Table 5.3 shows that a total of 
275 firm-years was identified with both ERM utilization and a risk committee. After 
                                                 
 
34 The approach of using “keyword” searching has been extensively used in previous research because 
organizations do not, in general, publicly disclose implementation -/- adoption of ERM (Pagach and 
Warr, 2010). An alternative approach could be the use of a survey of the firms to determine whether 
they are involved in ERM practices. However, this study leaves this method for future researchers 
because of time and resource constraints. In addition, the survey method would also be able to identify 
the extent and type of the adoption of ERM processes.   
35 In the case of the CRO or risk committee, Beasley, Clune and Hermanson (2005) discuss that their 
presence could indicate the presence of ERM in the following way. Organizations need an individual 
or a group of individuals to be responsible for the oversight of ERM processes and to ensure their 
objectives in addition to communicating relevant information to the board of directors. Moreover, 
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) discuss that the CRO or risk committee are considered as complements 





elimination of missing observations, the final sample consists of 260 firm-year 
observations, forming an unbalanced panel data. Observations are removed due to 
factors including delisting, merger and acquisition activity, and unavailability of 
data.       
Table 5.3. Sample Selection 
Description 2012 2013 2014 2015 N 
Number of companies 
using ERM processes 
73 94 102 141 410 
Less companies 
without a risk 
committee 
(24) (33) (35) (43) (135) 
ERM based companies 
with a risk committee 
49 61 67 98 275 
Less Missing Information (15) 
Firm-year observations (4-years) 260 
 
Moreover, Table 5.4 shows the industrial distribution of the sample based on 
the Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB). It shows that the financial industry 
represents the highest sample coverage of 56.65%. This is followed by the industrial 
sector that covers 18.08% of the sample. The health care, telecommunications, and 
oil and gas industries represent the lowest sample coverage.  
 
Table 5.4. Industrial Distribution of the Sample 
Industry 2012 2013 2014 2015 N Percentage 
(N) 
Financials 32 39 39 37 147 56.54 
Industrials 8 13 13 13 47 18.08 
Consumer Goods 4 6 6 5 21 8.08 
Basic Materials 5 5 5 5 20 7.69 
Health Care 2 3 3 2 10 3.85 
Telecommunications 2 2 2 2 8 3.08 
Oil and Gas 2 2 2 1 7 2.69 
Total 55 70 70 65 260 100% 
Note: This distribution is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).  
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5.6.2. Data Collection 
The data for this study is collected from multiple sources. At the first stage, the 
annual reports of all FTSE-350 companies are downloaded from their websites and 
Osiris (Public Companies) database for the years 2012 to 2015. The annual reports 
allowed the researcher to articulate a list of companies using ERM processes and a 
risk committee during the study period. The data on risk committee characteristics is 
collected from the sample companies’ annual reports. The data to calculate firm 
performance measure (Q) and ERMI is collected from both companies’ financial 
reports and the DataStream database.            
 
5.7. Chapter Summary 
The following research design issues have been discussed in this chapter. First, the 
current research purpose -/- objective and its position within the positivist paradigm 
were presented. The importance of quantitative analysis and hypothesis testing for 
this study based on the rationalization of positive accounting theory is explained. 
Second, this chapter provided a discussion on the rationalization of the risk 
committee in the form of a SRC and ARC as used in this study. Third, the chapter 
explains the variables of this study including their justification for selection and 
measurement. Fourth, the chapter explained the statistical analyses that include both 
descriptive and inferential techniques, and the tests of robustness to strengthen the 
findings. Finally, the sampling and data collection is discussed, including the 





Chapter 6: Analysis and Findings  
6.1. Chapter Introduction 
This chapter provides the results from the statistical analyses. Section 6.2 provides 
the descriptive statistics, including mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min), 
and maximum (Max) of the main variables. The results of this section are presented 
in Table 6.1. Section 6.3 gives the correlational analysis which discusses the pairwise 
linear association between the variables. The correlation matrixes are provided in 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 for the main variables and the interaction terms, respectively. 
Further, to investigate the hypotheses of this study, the chapter presents results from 
the multiple regression analysis in Section 6.4, Table 6.4. Section 6.5 presents and 
discusses the analyses of various techniques that are employed to achieve robustness 
of the overall findings. Section 6.6 summarises the main findings.    
 
6.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 displays descriptive statistics for the main variables of this study including 
mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min), and maximum (Max) values, both 
yearly and for the full sample. For firm performance, the average Q ratio is 1.53 (SD 
= .99) for the full sample. This indicates that on average, sample company stocks are 
overvalued. The ERMI shows the effectiveness of companies in utilizing their ERM 
processes. Thus, a Min of -7.72 and, Max of 20.77 for the full sample ERMI score 
illustrates that some listed UK companies are monitoring their ERM program very 
ineffectively while others are doing so highly effectively to achieve efficiency in 
their strategy, operations, reporting, and compliance as described by COSO (2004). 
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The mean of ERMI is 0 in all years because all eight constructs were standardized to 
yearly before being combined to form the index. (See Appendix A for more 
information). 
The risk committee characteristics also show noticeable variations. On 
average in the UK listed companies, the RCS and RCME are 4.63 (SD = 1.45) and 
5.11 (SD = 1.87), respectively. This highlights that the risk committees hold 
meetings frequently but are not fulfilling the size criteria for optimum monitoring as 
discussed by Walker (2009) for board committees. It further shows that the minimum 
number of RCME increases to 2 after the year 2013. In a pre-GFC study of 
Australian companies by Hoque et al. (2013), on average, risk committee members 
meet 1.746 times in a financial year. The findings of RCME in this study suggest that 
the number of risk committee meetings in UK listed companies have increased in the 
post-GFC period, perhaps as a means to achieve more effective diligence in risk 
oversight.36  The mean RCEXP is 2.35 (SD = 1.20) for the full sample, highlighting 
that companies are fulfilling the criteria of financial expertise as required by Walker 
(2009) necessary to make contributions regarding principal risk issues and 
discussions with the executive team. Moreover, the maximum number of RCEXP 
increases to 6 after the year 2012.    
The RCIND and RCNEXE show similar descriptive statistics as RCS in all 
years. This implies that on average there are a sufficient number of outside directors 
on risk committees to establish objective communication with the management. 
These findings represent a considerably higher proportion of outside directors in the 
UK compared to the study of Ng et al. (2013) who found on average 0.512 outside 
members in risk committees of Malaysian companies. The mean RCOL is 3.86 (SD 
                                                 
 
36 Since this study focuses on the board-level risk committees that emerged after the GFC. A future 




= 1.73) for the full sample, showing that risk committee members sufficiently 
overlap with other board-level committees. Further, the mean RCFM of 1.14 (SD = 
.89) in the sample UK listed companies shows a marginal representation of women 
in risk committees, with a maximum number of 4 female members. It also shows that 
the minimum number of RCFM is 0 in all years. The average RCN and RCEXE are 
also nominal in sample companies with mean of .21 (SD = .74) and .33 (SD = .88) in 
the full sample, respectively.  
For control variables, Table 6.1 shows the average BSIZE is 10.70 (SD = 
2.63), BMEET is 8.54 (SD = 2.84), and BIND is 6.53 (SD = 2.12) in the full sample. 
These results represent that the boards of the sample companies are of sufficient size, 
independence, and meet regularly as required by FRC (2014). Finally, Table 6.1 
shows that the average FSIZE is 9.33 (SD = .77) in the full sample. There are no 
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Table 6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Period N Q ERMI RCS RCME RCEXP RCIND RCNEXE RCOL RCFM RCN RCEXE BSIZE BMEET BIND FSIZE 
Mean 2012 55 1.425 0.000 4.545 5.164 2.109 3.964 4.036 3.800 0.909 0.273 0.509 11.109 9.018 6.618 9.365 
 
2013 70 1.656 0.000 4.686 4.886 2.214 4.314 4.386 3.843 1.114 0.171 0.271 10.586 8.357 6.414 9.326 
 
2014 70 1.574 0.000 4.686 5.157 2.400 4.400 4.457 3.857 1.243 0.186 0.271 10.514 8.571 6.343 9.332 
 
2015 65 1.601 0.000 4.615 5.277 2.662 4.185 4.138 3.954 1.262 0.262 0.338 10.692 8.323 6.785 9.335 
Full Sample 260 1.571 0.000 4.638 5.115 2.354 4.238 4.277 3.865 1.142 0.219 0.338 10.704 8.546 6.531 9.338 
SD 2012 55 0.723 3.146 1.399 1.970 1.012 1.360 1.453 1.556 0.752 1.008 1.052 2.773 3.252 2.050 0.820 
 
2013 70 1.193 2.898 1.528 1.846 1.238 1.518 1.506 1.758 0.910 0.589 0.779 2.684 2.537 2.102 0.789 
 
2014 70 0.983 3.053 1.509 2.005 1.256 1.564 1.557 1.859 0.999 0.597 0.779 2.541 3.210 2.077 0.771 
 
2015 65 1.269 3.482 1.400 1.672 1.215 1.391 1.456 1.754 0.871 0.776 0.940 2.567 2.333 2.267 0.737 
Full Sample 260 1.073 3.127 1.457 1.871 1.204 1.448 1.478 1.736 0.900 0.742 0.884 2.631 2.842 2.122 0.774 
Min 2012 55 0.365 -4.345 2.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.000 4.000 3.000 7.435 
 
2013 70 0.440 -4.774 3.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.000 3.000 3.000 7.749 
 
2014 70 0.458 -6.382 3.000 2.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.000 3.000 3.000 7.888 
 
2015 65 0.563 -7.545 2.000 2.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.000 4.000 4.000 7.901 
Full Sample 260 0.365 -7.545 2.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.000 3.000 3.000 7.435 
Max 2012 55 3.545 17.764 10.000 11.000 5.000 8.000 8.000 10.000 3.000 6.000 5.000 22.000 21.000 13.000 10.810 
 
2013 70 7.250 10.320 9.000 12.000 6.000 9.000 9.000 8.000 4.000 3.000 4.000 23.000 15.000 14.000 10.800 
 
2014 70 5.505 7.967 10.000 13.000 6.000 9.000 9.000 10.000 4.000 3.000 4.000 18.000 26.000 12.000 10.814 
 
2015 65 9.294 20.770 10.000 10.000 6.000 9.000 9.000 10.000 4.000 3.000 4.000 19.000 14.000 15.000 10.946 
Full Sample 260 9.294 20.770 10.000 13.000 6.000 9.000 9.000 10.000 4.000 6.000 5.000 23.000 26.000 15.000 10.946 




6.3. Correlational Analysis 
Table 6.2 presents analysis of the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients matrix 
between the variables (as described in Table 5.1 in the previous chapter). First, the 
correlation matrix depicts that the ERMI is positively and significantly correlated 
with Q at r = .201, p < .01. This is consistent with previous research that suggests 
that ERM contributes to shareholders’ wealth creation (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; 
Grace et al., 2015). Second, Table 6.2 illustrates that almost all the risk committee 
characteristics are negatively correlated with coefficient Q except RCFM which is 
positively and significantly correlated with Q at r = .138, p < .05. The RCOL also 
shows positive but insignificant correlation with Q at r = .028. A potential 
explanation of the RCFM findings is that the presence of female members on risk 
committees may function as a positive signal to the firm’s external environment 
(Rose, 2007) thus contributing towards shareholders’ value. Moreover, both RCME 
and RCN are negatively and significantly related with Q at r = -.141, p < .05 and r = 
-.128, p < .05 respectively.       
Third, Table 6.2 highlights very high correlations between four risk 
committee characteristics: RCS, RCIND, RCOL, and RCNEXE. For instance, the 
correlation between RCS and RCIND is r = .776, p < .01, and between RCOL and 
RCNEXE is r = .757, p = .01. The high correlation coefficients among these 
variables suggest that risk committees are generally composed of independent / 
nonexecutive directors who also hold memberships in other board-level committees. 
Due to the potential threat of multi-collinearity, these variables are not estimated 
simultaneously in regression analyses (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009). Finally, in Table 6.2, the control variables generally show negative 
correlation with Q and ERMI. Both BSIZE and BMEET are positively and 
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significantly related with FSIZE at r = .491, p < .01 and r = .253, p < .01 
respectively. This is consistent with the literature that highlights larger and complex 
firms require greater monitoring and advisory support (Guest, 2008). A high 
correlation between BSIZE and BIND of r = .810, p < .01 again indicate the potential 
issue of multi-collinearity. These variables are not estimated together in further 
analyses presented in subsequent sections. 













Table 6.2. Correlation Matrix 
  Q ERMI RCS RCME RCEXP RCIND RCNEXE RCOL RCFM RCN RCEXE BSIZE BMEET BIND 
ERMI .201***              
RCS -.073 -.117*             
RCME -.141** -.128** .062            
RCEXP -.098 -.157** .590*** .061           
RCIND -.039 -.103 .776*** .194*** .467***          
RCNEXE -.059 -.108* .787*** .168*** .489*** .956***         
RCOL .028 -.023 .744*** .076 .516*** .741*** .757***        
RCFM .138** -.016 .443*** .206*** .174*** .475*** .471*** .457***       
RCN -.128** -.033 .077 -.018 .172*** .066 .070 .065 -.128**      
RCEXE -.036 -.045 .281*** -.150** .130** -.293*** -.025 -.099 -.075 -.025     
BSIZE -.153** -.226*** .311*** .239*** .214*** .379*** .358*** .145** .104* .346*** -.045    
BMEET -.036 -.029 .014 .183*** .020 .101 .088 .116* .034 .143** -.129** .062   
BIND -.143** -.221*** .367*** .374*** .262*** .464*** .430*** .223*** .177*** .281*** -.080 .810*** .109*  
FSIZE -.137** -.052 .262*** .434*** .115* .372*** .340*** .226*** .255*** .240*** -.141** .491*** .253*** .571*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively.  
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6.4. Multiple Regression Analysis 
This section presents the results of the multiple regression analysis (in Table 6.3 and 
Table 6.4) based on the relationships developed in Chapter 5. As the data in this 
study is an unbalanced panel, the regressions are estimated using both pooled OLS 
and least square dummy variable (LSDV) methods. The pooled OLS allows for the 
combination of all the observations and assumes that there is no unobserved 
heterogeneity effect among cross-sectional units and time series. However, because 
the implementation and adoption of ERM and risk committees may have differential 
effects among industries (for instance the financial industry) or different time 
periods, this study employs the LSDV method that controls for unobserved factors. 
Moreover, the Breusch-Pagan test confirms the presence of heteroscedasticity in all 
models. Thus, the study tests the significance of coefficients using White (1980) 
robust standard errors in both pooled OLS and LSDV estimations. Overall, the 
analysis reveals that ERM significantly and positively affects firm performance 
measured by Q, and this relationship is further affected by risk committee 
characteristics. The following sections provide in-depth discussion on the findings. 
  
6.4.1. Controlled Effects 
The control variables are entered in all models. Firstly, it is prominent that FSIZE is 
negatively related with Q, however once the industry effects are controlled this 
variable became significant in LSDV estimations, as shown in column 5 of Table 6.3 
(β = -.198, t = -2.983) and in column 7 of Table 6.4 (β = -.147, t = -1.717). This is 
consistent with Kiel and Nicholson (2003) who argue that large firms find it 
excessively difficult to produce higher stock returns compared to small firms. 




For instance, column 6 of Table 6.3 depicts that the coefficient of BSIZE (β = .016, t 
= .300) is positive and the coefficient of BMEET (β = -.016, t = -.391) is negative, 
however their impacts are insignificant.    
 
6.4.2. Main Effects 
The main effects include ERMI and risk committee characteristics variables. The 
purpose of the estimations presented in Table 6.3 is to test the impact of ERM and 
risk committee characteristics on firm performance (H1 and H2a). The ERMI shows 
strong positive and significant impact on Q in both pooled OLS and LSDV 
estimations. For instance, column 1 in Table 6.3 shows the coefficient of ERMI is (β 
= .165, t = 2.755). This is consistent with the previous literature that position ERM as 
a value creation tool (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Nocco and Stulz, 2006; Farrell and 
Gallagher, 2015). Moreover, the impacts of risk committee characteristics on Q are 
not uni-directional. First, the RCS is negatively associated with Q as shown in 
column 5 of Table 6.3, this relationship becomes strongly significant at (β = -.178, t 
= -2.847) once the industry and time effects are controlled. The RCME also shows 
negative and significant impact on Q at (β = -.119, t = -1.813) in column 1 of Table 
6.3. Vafeas (1999) argues that it is possible to achieve economies in agency costs if a 
firm potentially efficient in organizing directors’ meeting frequency matched with its 
environment. However, if the benefits are overemphasized, it would negatively affect 
firm performance as high costs are attached with directors’ meetings such as 
traveling, managerial time, and meeting fees. The RCEXP is positively related with 
Q in LSDV regressions and shows strong significance in estimation provided in 
column 5 at (β = .145, t = 2.400). Both RCIND and RCNEXE show negative and 
significant impact on Q at (β = -.135, t = -2.222) in column 6 and (β = -.182, t = -
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3.009) in column 8 respectively. The RCOL depicts positive but insignificant relation 
with Q in both OLS and LSDV estimations. However, this study has taken RCOL as 
the number of risk committee members in all board-level committees. Future 
research could examine the risk committee overlapping more specifically with the 
audit committee or remuneration committee. Further, the RCFM is found to have a 
positive and strong significant impact on Q in all models. The positive impacts of 
both RCEXP and RCFM highlight the favourable outcomes of expertise and 
diversity of the risk committee members on shareholders’ value. The RCN is 
negatively related with Q and shows strong significance in the model presented in the 
column 3 at (β = -.097, t = -2.418). The negative impact of RCN again highlights the 
increasing levels of monitoring and operational costs associated with higher number 
of committees. Finally, RCEXE shows strong negative effect on Q in LSDV 





Table 3. Multiple Regression Analysis Showing the Effects of ERMI and Risk Committee Characteristics on Q 
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RCIND  -.028 
(-.377) 
   -.150** 
(-2.477) 
  
RCNEXE    -.072 
(-1.007) 
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(-2.423) 
RCOL   .103 
(1.578) 































































D (Consumer Goods)     .203*** .201*** .184*** .206*** 
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(3.864) (3.831) (3.613) (3.923) 
















































R2  .110 .108 .085 .110 .437 .433 .413 .434 
F Statistic 3.703*** 3.840*** 3.981*** 3.709*** 5.460*** 5.540*** 5.367*** 5.445*** 
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 
Highest VIF 2.203 2.214 1.696 2.135 2.342 2.356 2.213 2.266 
Breusch-Pagan 𝜒2  123.175*** 122.157*** 113.223*** 121.919*** 320.599*** 320.120*** 343.624*** 320.048*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate coefficient is significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. The significance of coefficients is based on White (1980) robust standard 





6.4.3. Interaction Effects 
The interaction effects include the interaction terms (ERMI*risk committee 
characteristics) to elucidate the positive and negative influences of risk committee 
characteristics on the relationship between ERMI and Q. The findings of interaction 
terms relate to the second hypothesis (H2b) of this study. First, the ERMI*RCS 
exerts a negative impact on the ERM-Performance relationship, such as column 1 of 
Table 6.4 shows (β = -.195, t = -2.187). This could possibly support the argument 
that the presence of a large number of members in a risk committee possibly leads to 
free rider problem (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), thus weakening the efficiency of 
ERM (Dalton et al., 1999).  
Second, the moderating impact of ERMI*RCME on ERMI and Q is also 
negative with weak significance in OLS estimations such as (β = -.123, t = -1.835) in 
column 3 of Table 6.4. This is consistent with Hoque et al. (2013) who also find that 
risk committee meeting frequency is not associated with performance of Australian 
companies. In contrast to the benefits of directors’ meetings, Vafeas (1999) argues 
that the negative impacts of meetings could be due to the associated potential costs 
such as travel expenses, managerial time, and directors meeting fees. He further 
highlights that if the benefits of meetings are over emphasized, this would be 
negatively associated with firm value.  
Third, the ERMI*RCEXP strengthens the ERM-Performance relationship, 
such as (β = .233, t = 3.232) in column 1 of Table 6.4. This is consistent with the 
literature that suggests financial literacy develops overall risk governance by 
improving reliability of corporate reporting (Bédard et al., 2004; Abbott et al., 2004), 
which is one of the main pillars of the COSO (2004) ERM framework. Further, 
DeFond, Hann and Hu (2005) argue that financial experts complement strong 
 114 Chapter 6: Analysis and Findings 
corporate governance mechanisms and their appointments are linked with positive 
market reaction.  
Fourth, the ERMI*RCIND significantly weakens the impact of ERM on Q, 
such as (β = -.171, t = -2.208) in column 2 of Table 6.4. This suggests that risk 
committee independence has detrimental effects on the relationship between ERM 
and firm performance. Similarly, the effect of ERMI*RCNEXE is also negative on 
the relationship between ERMI and Q and shows weak significance in OLS 
estimation at (β = -.158, t = -1.878) in column 4 of Table 6.4.  Agency theory 
predicts positive associations between outside directors and monitoring (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) which in turn is expected to increase firm performance. However, 
the literature provides mixed evidence (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Black, Jang and 
Kim, 2006; Lefort and Urzúa, 2008). Opponents of this view claim that the outside 
directors may be independent in their evaluation of firm performance; however, since 
they possess less knowledge about the organization, their judgments could be biased 
as they are based on information provided by the managers. Koerniadi and Tourani-
Rad (2012) argue that the outside directors can add value to the firm only if they are 
in the minority. In this study, the average number of outside directors (independent -
/- non-executives) is almost equal to the risk committee size, which means that the 
outside directors represent the majority.  
Fifth, the ERMI*RCOL shows a positive but insignificant influence on the 
relationship between ERMI and Q. This is consistent with Bates and Leclerc (2009) 
who argue that “cross-committee synergies” are one of the benefits for risk 
committees in ERM. The overlapping memberships may reduce the chance of risks 
“slipping through the cracks”, and also act as a coordinator with other board-level 




ensuring that all risks are properly attended to. Since the regression coefficients of 
ERMI*RCOL are insignificant in both OLS and LSDV estimation, this researcher is 
unable to infer or generalize concerning the moderating impact of RCOL in this 
section. The robustness tests in subsequent sections provide further elaboration on 
this relationship.  
Sixth, the ERMI*RCFM shows a positive and significant moderating impact 
on ERM-Performance relationship at (β = .208, t = 2.226) as depicted in column 1 of 
Table 6.4. Gender differences in risk propensity could explain the mechanism 
through which female representation affects overall risk management (Lenard et al., 
2014). Women are found to be more risk averse (Schubert, 2006), generally show 
lower tolerance when compared to men concerning opportunistic behaviour in 
decision-making, and avoid aggressive earnings management (Powell and Ansic, 
1997). Moreover, the positive impacts of ERMI*RCFM are also consistent with the 
assertion that a higher level of gender diversity acts as a positive signal to the firm’s 
external environment (Rose, 2007) thus contributing towards firm value.  
Seventh, ERMI*RCN shows a strong negative impact on the relationship 
between ERMI and Q in both OLS and LSDV estimations such as depicted in 
column 3 at (β = -.148, t = -4.796). This is inconsistent with Nahar et al. (2016) who 
find positive association between the number of risk committees and firm 
performance. However, in this study the RCN is measured as the number of non-
board level risk committees that generally operate at management levels. The effects 
of RCN may highlight the high level of operational costs and the problems of 
communication and coordination in ERM (Mehran, 2008).  
Finally, the ERMI*RCEXE also shows a negative influence on the 
relationship between ERMI and Q. This is only significant in LSDV estimations as 
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presented in column 6 at (β = -.128, t = -3.243) and column 7 at (β = -.106, t = -
2.768). These findings suggest that a high number of executive directors can hamper 
the efficiency of the risk oversight function of a risk committee, which could result in 
higher agency costs (Hines et al., 2015) and thus negatively affect firm performance.  
The dummies of industry specific effects show that only D(Consumer Goods) is 
positively and significantly associated with Q, such as at (β = .352, t = 2.219) 
reported in column 5 of Table 6.4. This suggests that firms in the consumer goods 
industry have, on average, a higher Q compared to firms in other industries based on 
some unobserved heterogeneity factors. In contrast, the column 9 of the Table 
provides results of a regression controlling just for financial industry. The results of 
independent and interaction variables are consistent with previous specification. 
However, it shows that D(Financial) is negatively associated with Q at (β = -.393, t = -
3.987) as financial companies were most affected by the GFC. Finally, the time 





Table 6.4. Multiple Regression Analysis Showing Effect of ERMI on Q Moderated by Risk Committee Characteristics 
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(-3.103) 






































RCIND  -.072 
(-.954) 
   -.152** 
(-2.544) 
   
RCNEXE    -.093 
(-1.285) 
   -.183*** 
(-3.058) 
 
RCOL   .122* 
(1.814) 
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ERMI*RCS -.195** 
(-2.187) 
   -.124* 
(-1.741) 






































ERMI*RCIND  -.171** 
(-2.208) 
   -.114* 
(-1.783) 
   
ERMI*RCNEXE    -.158* 
(-1.878) 
   -.088 
(-1.327) 
 
ERMI*RCOL   .080 
(1.219) 













































































































































R2  .175 .173 .142 .173 .382 .377 .348 .380 .272 
F Statistic 3.978*** 3.838*** 4.455*** 4.047*** 5.428*** 5.230*** 4.080*** 5.325*** 4.441*** 
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 
Highest VIF 3.759 2.980 1.758 3.305 5.202 5.197 4.955 5.183 3.783 
Breusch-Pagan 𝜒2  125.166*** 121.560*** 137.593*** 121.146*** 280.987*** 276.641*** 297.035*** 276.073*** 215.381*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate coefficient is significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. The significance of coefficients is based on White (1980) robust standard 
errors. The Breusch-Pagan 𝜒2 tests the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity in the model. The LSDV regressions include dummies to control industry and time specific 
effects. ^ The results were consistent in other specifications.  
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6.5. Robustness of Findings 
First, the study employs a number of variables relating to the structure and 
composition of the risk committee. This allows the partial effect of each risk 
committee characteristic to reflect its impact while controlling for the effects of other 
characteristics. Second, the potential issue of multi-collinearity is addressed by 
analysing the pairwise correlation coefficients among the variables as provided in 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. Highly correlated variables are not entered simultaneously 
in the regression estimations. Moreover, the variance inflation factors (VIF) are 
calculated in all models as an additional check for multi-collinearity. The highest 
VIF are reported for each the estimation, ensuring that all the values are below 10 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Third, the Breusch-Pagan test is conducted to check the 
homoscedasticity assumption. The test revealed the presence of heteroscedasticity in 
all estimations. To address this issue, the study reports t-statistics in all models 
calculated using robust standard errors based on the consistent variance-covariance 
matrix as proposed by White (1980). Fourth, the issue of endogeneity is a major 
concern in corporate governance studies, especially when studying board 
characteristics and firm performance relationships. As the basic purpose of this study 
is to examine the impact of risk committee characteristics on the relationship 
between ERM and firm performance, therefore it is critical to explore the potential 
threat of the presence of endogeneity in the empirical analyses. This study tests for 
endogeneity of explanatory variables based on the procedure as described in 
Wooldridge (2012, p. 534). In the first stage of this procedure, each of the corporate 
governance variables (including board and risk committee characteristics) are 
considered as endogenous and it is assumed that they can be estimated using a full 




as an additional independent variable in the original models as depicted in the 
previous estimations. If the RESID is significant it would represent that a particular 
board or risk committee characteristic is actually an endogenous variable. This test 
revealed that all the RESID variables were insignificant with p > .10 given Q as the 
dependent variable, highlighting the absence of endogeneity in all estimations. 
In addition to the above techniques of robustness, the study also replaces the 
dependent variable, Q, with price-to-book (PB). This allowed testing of the 
sensitivity of the previous results. Further, an independent t-test is conducted to 
compare the firm performance of ERM and non-ERM users. Finally, as previous 
findings suggest that most of the variables relating to the structure and composition 
of the risk committee negatively affect the ERM and firm performance relationship, 
the study further tests this assertion by differentiating the effect of ERM users with 
and without a risk committee by using a dummy variable. This is further confirmed 
by employing the test of the equality of regression coefficients. The following 
sections provide the findings each of these discussed techniques of robustness.     
 
6.5.1. Alternative Performance Measure 
This section presents the results of multiple regression analysis by replacing the 
dependent variable, Q, with Price-to-Book (PB) ratio in the original relationships. In 
the literature, the PB ratio is used as a proxy for market value performance (De 
Andres, Azofra and Lopez, 2005). The PB ratio is defined as the price per share 
divided by book value per share. Accordingly, it does not consider the impact of firm 
debt levels. This study employs PB ratio to test the sensitivity of findings. Like 
previous analyses, the regressions are estimated using both pooled OLS and LSDV 
techniques and the t-ratios are based on the White (1980) robust standard errors. 
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Overall, compared to the findings presented in Table 6.4, the results provided in 
Table 6.5 show increased explanatory power and model fitness in all regression 
estimations.  
The analysis shows that the ERMI is positively and significantly related with 
PB ratio in all estimations. This is consistent with the results provided in the previous 
section. It highlights that effective ERM processes achieve efficiency in a firm’s 
strategy, operations, reporting, and compliance functions, and consequently these 
functions contribute to shareholders’ wealth creation. Further, the risk committee 
characteristics show that the RCS, RCIND, RCNEXE, RCN, and RCEXE negatively 
and significantly determine the PB ratio, while the RCEXP and RCFM show positive 
and significant impact. Finally, the direction of the coefficients of interaction 
variables is similar to the previous results; however, this analysis shows an increase 
in their significance levels. For instance, the ERMI*RCME shows a strong negative 
impact in OLS estimations such as at (β = -.200, t = -2.740) as reported in column 3 
of Table 6.5. The coefficients of ERMI*RCIND and ERMI*RCNEXE also show 
strong negative impact on PB ratio in both OLS and LSDV estimations. The 
ERMI*RCOL is now positively and significantly related to PB ratio in both OLS 
estimation at (β = .167, t = 2.498) as reported in column 3 and for LSDV estimation 
at (β = .110, t = 2.048) as reported in column 7 of Table 6.5. Moreover, the 
ERMI*RCNEXE also shows a strong negative significance in OLS estimation at (β = 
-.231, t = -2.584) in column 4 and in LSDV estimation at (β = -.158, t = -2.221) 
reported in column 8 of Table 6.5. These findings again highlight that the weak 
monitoring role of risk committees deteriorates the value generation function of 
ERM; however, financial expertise, gender diversity, and multiple memberships of 




Table 6.5. Multiple Regression Analysis Showing Effect of ERMI on PB Ratio Moderated by Risk Committee Characteristics 
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(-2.964) 






































RCIND  -.081 
(-1.101) 
   -.168*** 
(-2.896) 
   
RCNEXE    -.062 
(-.881) 
   -.156*** 
(-2.626) 
 
RCOL   .062 
(.880) 
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(-2.476) 
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ERMI*RCIND  -.230*** 
(-2.849) 
   -.173*** 
(-2.689) 
   
ERMI*RCNEXE    -.231** 
(-2.584) 
   -.158** 
(-2.221) 
 
ERMI*RCOL   .167** 
(2.498) 










































































































































R2  .263 .262 .223 .260 .483 .482 .455 .480 .369 
F Statistic 7.343*** 6.960*** 6.229*** 7.606*** 7.768*** 7.757*** 6.195*** 7.588*** 7.059*** 
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 
Highest VIF 3.759 2.980 1.758 3.305 5.202 5.197 4.955 5.183 3.783 
Breusch-Pagan  𝜒2  142.793*** 140.400*** 164.014*** 139.743*** 305.332*** 299.730**** 314.111*** 301.792*** 234.534*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate coefficient is significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. The significance of coefficients is based on White (1980) robust standard 





6.5.2. Firm Performance of ERM and Non-ERM Firms 
This section presents the results of an independent t-test comparing the firm 
performance of ERM and non-ERM firms (Table 6.6). This test is conducted to 
strengthen the findings of RQ1. Based on theoretical claims about the 
implementation of ERM established from the literature and theory, this study expects 
that the financial performance of firms utilizing ERM processes should be greater 
than non-ERM based firms. For the purpose of comparison, a sample of non-ERM 
firms comprising of 260 firm-year observations is selected which is equal to the 
original sample of this study. 
Table 6.6 shows that the mean differences of both Q and P/B are .174, p < .05 
and .140, p < .05 respectively. This implies that the market value performance of the 
firms using ERM processes is significantly greater than non-ERM firms. These 
findings are consistent with previous literature that position ERM as a value relevant 
program, and also provides support for RQ1. Further, Table 6.6 compares the 
profitability ratios (EPS and ROA) between ERM and non-ERM users. The results 
show that the mean differences of both EPS and ROA are positive but insignificant. 
This implies that the efficiency of ERM based firms to generate profits is greater in 
the study sample but the findings are not generalizable due to insignificance of the t-
stat. These findings are also consistent with previous research that claims the benefits 
of ERM become apparent in the long term (Farrell and Gallagher, 2015) and do not 
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Table 6.6. Independent Sample t-Test Showing the Mean Differences of Firm Performance between 
ERM and Non-ERM Firms 































N 260 260  
Notes: *, **, *** indicate coefficient is significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.  
 
 
6.5.3. Impact of ERM on Firm Performance in the Presence -/- Absence of Risk 
Committees 
This section presents the results of a robustness test in order to strengthen the 
findings of RQ2. In the previous analyses, it is found that most of the risk committee 
characteristics (especially those related to monitoring) negatively affect the ERM and 
firm performance relationship. Likewise, it can be inferred that the presence of a 
board-level risk committee could be detrimental to the performance implications of 
ERM. This assertion is tested based on a multiple regression analysis of ERM based 
firms with and without a risk committee as presented in Table 6.7. The analysis is 
conducted using a sample size of 392 firm-year observations having implemented 
ERM process throughout the study period. The absence and presence of the risk 
committee is measured by a dummy variable (DRC) that takes the value of 1 if a firm 
has a board-level risk committee (including SRC or ARC) or otherwise 0. The 
significance of the variables reported in both pooled OLS and LSDV estimation is 
based on the White (1980) robust standard errors.   
Table 6.7 shows that ERM significantly and positively affects the Q, such as 




significantly related to Q at (β = -.092, t = -2.016) in pooled OLS estimation, 
however in LSDV this variable is not significant. Since all industry and time specific 
dummies are insignificant in LSDV estimation, we can rely on the results of pooled 
OLS regression and consider its estimates as efficient (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
Thus, the negative coefficient of DRC suggests that the presence of a risk committee 
is negatively associated with firm performance measured by Q.  
 
Table 6.7. Multiple Regression Analysis Showing the Impact of ERM on Firm Performance Measured 
by Q in the Absence and Presence of Risk Committees 


















D (Oil and Gas)  -.037 
(-.358) 
D(Industrials)   -.073 
(-.430) 
D (Consumer Goods)  .163 
(1.048) 
D (Health Care)  .056 
(.537) 
D(Telecommunication)  -.063 
(-.771) 
D(Financials)  -.231 
(-1.139) 
D (2012)  -.033 
(-.608) 
D (2013)  .027 
(.417) 
D (2014)  -.016 
(-.269) 
R2  .068 .158 
F Statistic 8.562*** 4.417*** 
Observations 392 392 
Highest VIF 1.326 6.774 
Breusch-Pagan   160.358*** 327.169*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate coefficient is significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. The 
significance of coefficients is based on White (1980) robust standard errors. The Breusch-Pagan 
tests the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity in the model. The LSDV regressions include 
dummies to control industry and time specific effects. 
 
In addition to the above analysis, the following Clogg, Petkova and Haritou 
(1995) test of the equality of regression coefficients is also employed. This test 
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allows the efficient determination of whether the casual effect or empirical 
relationship estimated from two independent samples is equivalent (Paternoster et 
al., 1998). To perform this test, two independent regressions are estimated in which 
Q is estimated as a function of ERM and FSIZE. In the first regression, the 
coefficient of ERM is based on sample firms without a board-level risk committee (N 
= 132), while in the second regression this ERM coefficient is based on firms with a 
board-level risk committee (N = 260). The following test is then applied in order to 
compare the ERM coefficients extracted from two different regressions:       
 
𝑧 =
𝛽1 −  𝛽2
√𝑆𝐸𝛽1




In the above equation, 𝛽1 represents the ERM regression coefficient extracted 
from the sample without a risk committee, 𝛽2 is the ERM regression coefficient from 
the sample having a risk committee, and 𝑆𝐸𝛽 represents the standard error of the beta 
coefficient. The test reveals the inequality of coefficients at (z = .6001, p < .01) 
which highlights that the impact of ERM on Q is significantly higher in firms 
without a risk committee compared to those having a risk committee.     
 
6.6. Chapter Summary 
First, this chapter presented the descriptive statistics for the study variables. Second, 
the correlational analysis is presented among the variables in Table 6.2. The 
correlations of independent variables with the dependent variable generally illustrates 
that the ERMI is strongly and positively related with Q, while most of the risk 




Moreover, correlations among RCS, RCIND, RCOL, and RCNEXE are very high. 
These variables were not entered simultaneously in the regression analyses to avoid 
the potential threat of multi-collinearity. Third, the chapter presented the results of 
multiple regression analyses. The estimation techniques involved were pooled OLS 
and LSDV regression. Overall the results show that the ERMI is significantly 
associated with Q and the risk committee characteristics are found to influence this 
relationship in both directions. The interaction effects show that the ERMI*RCS, 
ERMI*RCME, ERMI*RCIND, ERMI*RCN, ERMI*RCEXE, and ERMI*RCNEXE 
negatively affect the relationship between ERM and Q, while the ERMI*RCEXP, 
ERMI*RCOL, and ERMI*RCFM show positive effects on the relationship between 
ERM and Q. Finally, the chapter discusses the various techniques that are used to 










































7. Conclusions, Implications and Limitations 
7.1. Chapter Introduction 
This chapter reconsiders the purpose of this study and offers a summary of the 
overall findings (Section 7.2). This is followed by a discussion of the practical 
implications relating to risk governance for corporations and regulators in Section 
7.3. Finally, the chapter highlights the limitations of this study and suggest avenues 
for future research in Section 7.4.    
 
7.2. Purpose of the Study and Summary of Findings 
The corporate downfalls in the early 2000s and the recent GFC provided the impetus 
for UK regulators to recommend that listed companies adopt sophisticated risk 
management practices. In the UK, the post-GFC period is market by the voluntary 
adoption of ERM and the emergence of board-level risk committees, especially in 
FTSE-350 companies (as depicted in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.3, respectively). 
Theoretically, an ERM approach is considered a more effective and efficient method 
compared to traditional silo-based risk management and consequently it should 
contribute to firm performance. In addition, the favourable arguments for the 
formation of a risk committee consider it to be an integral component of overall risk 
management that assists the board of directors in carrying out ERM responsibilities 
such as risk oversight, fostering risk culture, and improving the quality of risk 
reporting and monitoring. In this light, motivated by the paucity of research in the 
UK context, this study first investigated whether an ERM approach contributes to 
firm performance (RQ1). Secondly, as the formation of risk committees is 
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increasingly common in order to review the ERM processes of an organization, this 
study examined whether their composition and structure strengthened or weakened 
the relationship between ERM and firm performance (RQ2). To test the hypotheses 
formulated from these research questions, this study used regression analysis. The 
results are robust to statistical analyses and alternative specifications. Also, the use of 
a number of risk committee characteristics that comprehensively reflect its structure 
and composition increases the precision of partial coefficients in these regression 
analyses. 
With regard to RQ1, the statistical analyses reveal that an ERM system 
positively contributes to firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. These findings 
provide support to the theoretical claims regarding performance-/-valuation 
implications of the implementation of ERM which include (but not limited) to the 
reduction in stock price and earnings volatility through coordination of risk activities, 
holistic involvement of employees at all levels, and the use of natural hedges. This 
implies that the higher the effectiveness of a firm’s ERM, the higher the ability to 
achieve its strategic objectives relating to strategy, operations, reporting, and 
compliance as described by COSO (2004).  
The results relating to the RQ2 provide mixed evidence with regard to the 
impact of risk committee characteristics on the relationship between ERM and firm 
performance. Firstly, the statistical analysis suggests that the number of financial 
experts complement the valuation outcomes of ERM. This is consistent with 
previous research that suggests the presence of financial experts benefits the firm 
because of their ability to enhance the oversight function of risk committees in the 
financial reporting process (Bédard et al., 2004). The findings of this study suggest 




by enhancing reporting reliability, one of the four main pillars of COSO (2004), by 
enhancing reporting quality, thus positively contributing to firm performance. 
Another possible explanation comes from signalling effects, which suggest that the 
appointment or presence of financial experts works via positive market publicity 
(Defound et al., 2005), as experts are more selective in choosing which firms to join.  
The findings of this study also suggest that gender diversity in risk 
committees positively affects the valuation outcomes of ERM. This is also consistent 
with previous research that advocates favourable arguments for female representation 
on the board (Post and Byron, 2015) and its outcomes on risk management and firm 
performance. In this study, the presence of female members in risk committees 
complements the valuation outcomes of ERM. Gender diversity in the risk 
committee could complement the ERM function through its positive effects on 
earnings quality. This is supported by arguments that female directors are more 
diligent in their monitoring behaviour, demand greater accountability, and have 
lower tolerance in opportunistic behaviour compared to men (Dwyer et al., 2002; 
Adams and Ferreira, 2009). In opposition to “group thinking” (FRC, 2014), female 
members on the board show higher independence, which is necessary for better 
oversight (Adams, Gray and Nowland, 2010). Moreover, the positive impacts of 
female representation on valuation outcomes of ERM also support previous literature 
that argues for the signalling effects of board diversity (Rose, 2007). This suggests 
that a higher percentage of female directors acts as positive signal to external 
stakeholders as a measure of independence and transparency (Lückerath-Rovers, 
2013).  
Secondly, the analysis reveals that the risk committee size, number of 
meetings, proportion of outside directors, executives, and number of non-board risk 
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committees negatively affect the impact of ERM on firm performance. In addition to 
the potential reasons for the negative impacts of these characteristics, the study also 
supports the discussion of Guest (2008) that UK corporate governance plays a weak 
monitoring role on the following grounds. First, while the FRC (2014) requires 
boards to perform their risk management duty with diligence and loyalty, Black, 
Cheffins and Klausner (2005) find that lawsuits against outside directors are very 
rare in the UK. Ozkan (2007) argues that since outside directors are very infrequently 
held accountable, they consider their main role to constitute advising instead of 
monitoring. Second, the actual independence of outside directors is weak due to their 
highly informal appointments as stated by Higgs (2003): “A high level of informality 
surrounds the process of appointing non-executive directors. Almost half of the non-
executive directors surveyed for the Review were recruited to their role through 
personal contacts or friendships. Only four per cent had had a formal interview, and 
one per cent had obtained their job through answering an advertisement. This 
situation was widely criticised in responses to consultation, and I accept that it can 
lead to an overly familiar atmosphere in the boardroom” (p. 39). The Walker (2009) 
report also highlights this issue and states that appointments on the board should be 
made based on merit and the previous experience of the candidate. Third, another 
barrier to the monitoring function is the insufficient pay incentive for outside 
directors to fulfil their tasks effectively (Higgs, 2003).  
 
7.3. Practical Implications 
The findings of this study have clear practical implications. First, as the results show 
that ERM is positively related to firm performance, its adoption is likely to be more 




adoption is not enough – an effective ERM system is necessary to achieve efficiency 
in business strategy, operations, reporting and compliance, and to generate positive 
effects on shareholders’ wealth creation. The best practices of ERM function as 
described by COSO (2004) generally include (but are not limited to) a holistic 
method of risk management, standardization of risk measures, formalization of risk 
ownership at all levels of the organization, engagement of all employees in risk 
management processes, localization of risk culture, and assurance of proper 
recording, documentation and communication of risks and opportunities.  
Secondly, since ERM is a holistic approach embedded throughout the 
organization, this provides a multifaceted platform for corporate governance when 
focusing on value maximization through risk management. This study finds that with 
regard to the oversight function of the ERM process, the concept of board-level risk 
committees is not a panacea. The valuation outcomes of ERM are affected by the 
structure and composition of the risk committee. The findings suggest that in order to 
support better quality monitoring, corporate regulatory bodies in the UK should issue 
clear guidelines on the formation and structure of risk committees. The Walker 
(2009) report promotes the creation of risk committees and extensively describes 
their responsibilities, but does not stipulate clear guidelines on their structure and 
composition such as committee size, number of meetings among the committee 
members and with other parties like internal and external auditors. This could 
adversely affect the monitoring ability of risk committees because of the danger of 
broken linkages in the overall risk management process or confusion created by 
redundant activities of risk oversight at various levels of the organization.   
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7.4. Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
As with all research, this study is also not free from limitations. First, the small 
sample size limits the generalizability of findings. Second, the study has included 
both SRC and ARC in conceptualizing the adoption of risk committees. 
Subramaniam et al. (2009) argues that the expected level of risk monitoring would 
be higher if there is a SRC. Based on the adoption trends of ERM and risk 
committees (as depicted in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.3, respectively) SRC are 
becoming increasingly common, especially after the GFC. Future researchers will be 
able to employ larger samples in order to extend the generalization and to 
substantiate the differential impacts of SRC and ARC. Third, this study has 
employed an ERM index developed by Gordon et al. (2009) to measure the 
effectiveness of the ERM system of a company. This index is constructed based on 
COSO (2004) and proficiently measures the strength of an ERM program based on 
two independent measures for each of the four COSO (2004) ERM pillars. However, 
the index is unable to capture the maturity of the ERM program of a firm. A future 
study is indeed required that focuses on developing a more sophisticated ERM index 
especially in the UK setting. Fourth, this study ignores the independence of the ERM 
function. The Walker (2009) report requires that an independent CRO should 
participate in the risk management and risk oversight process that is ultimately 
accountable to the full board. A future potential study in this area is to examine the 
risk reporting framework in term of to whom the CRO is accountable and 
consequences linked to the efficiency of the ERM function and risk committee 
monitoring. Finally, this study finds that the presence of financial experts and gender 
diversity of risk committee members show a strong positive influence on the impact 




sufficient diversity for effective functioning. Future researchers could study further 
diversity of risk committee members in terms of age, education, previous experience, 
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This study has adopted an ERM Index developed by Gordon et al. (2009). The index 
is made up of two independent measures for each of the COSO (2004) ERM 
objectives. This index represents the effectiveness of a company’s ERM towards 
achieving strategic objectives relative to its strategy, operations, reporting, and 
compliance. The following equation depicts the main components of this index. Each 
measure is standardized before combining to calculate the composite score of ERM 
for each firm-year. The calculation of each measure is explained below.   












The strategy represents the ability of a firm to position itself in the market relative to 
their competitors. First, 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦1 measures how a company is competing within an 
industry in terms of maximizing their sales opportunities. Second, 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦2 
reflects the ability of a company within the industry to lower its systematic risk.    
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦1 =  (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 −  𝜇𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)/𝜎𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  
Where: 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖 = the total sales -/- revenues of a company in each year, 𝜇𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = 
average industry sales -/- revenues each year, and 𝜎𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 = is the standard deviation 
of the sales -/- revenues of all the companies in an industry.  
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦2 = (∆𝛽𝑖 − 𝜇∆𝛽)/𝜎∆𝛽  
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Where: ∆𝛽𝑖 = change in the beta of a company, 𝜇∆𝛽 = average change in industry 
beta, and 𝜎∆𝛽 = standard deviation of the change in beta of all the companies in the 
same industry.   
 
• Operations 
Gordon et al. (2009) considered operations to represent the operating efficiency of a 
firm in terms of the input-output relationship. They proposed the following measures 
of operational effectiveness that represent the ability to increase performance and 
value. First, 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠1 denotes total assets turnover measuring the efficiency of a 
firm’s assets in terms of generating sales -/- revenues. Second, 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠2 
represents an input-output relationship in terms of sales -/- revenues generated per 
employee. 
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠1 = (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)/(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠2 = (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)/(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠)  
 
• Reporting 
The financial reporting reliability is considered as an important factor affecting a 
firm’s overall risk. First,  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1 is measured by combining three factors: 
Material Weakness, Auditor Opinion, and Restatement. Each of the factors is rated as 
-1 or 0 in terms of their presence or absence, respectively. For instance, if a firm has 
reported any material weakness during the financial year then it is rated as -1 
otherwise 0. Thus, the range of this variable is between -3 to 0. Secondly, 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2 represents the ratio of normal accruals to total accruals. The abnormal 
accruals are estimated using the Jones (1991) accruals estimation model and normal 
accruals are calculated by deducting abnormal accruals from total accruals.   
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𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔1 = (𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠) + (𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛) + (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)  
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔2 =
∣𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠∣
∣𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠∣ + ∣𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠∣
  
Jones (1991) accruals estimation model: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
=  𝛼𝑗𝑡 [
1
𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
] + 𝛽1𝑗𝑡 [
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
] +  𝛽2𝑗𝑡 [
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
] + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Where: 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 = total accruals for each company in industry, 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 = total assets in 
previous year, ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 = change in net revenues -/- sales, and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 = property, 
plant, and equipment. The abnormal accruals are 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 in the above equation.  
 
• Compliance 
Compliance depicts adherence of a firm towards applicable laws and regulations. 
First, 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒1 measures the ratio of auditor fees to total assets. Second, 
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Appendix B 
Walker (2009) Recommendations for SRCs in the UK 
Following are the summarized recommendations of Walker (2009) for SRCs 
regarding their structure and functions in the UK.  
i. Composition and Role of SRC: 
• The SRC should be a “board-level committee” like an audit committee 
and must be chaired by a non-executive director. 
• The executive risk committee (if there is one) chaired by a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) or Chief Financial Officer (CFO) should work 
under the direction of the SRC. 
• The SRC should have a sufficient overlap with the audit committee, or at 
least the participation of the audit committee chairman is compulsory. 
• The board will decide the division of responsibilities between the audit 
committee and the SRC, contingent on overlap between them. 
• The SRC should advise the board regarding all principal risks. The 
consultation with the board should not be extended into operational 
matters. 
• The executive team should not distract or dilute the focus of the SRC 
over the principal risks. 
• A non-executive financial expert with sufficient relevant experience 
should make his/her contributions to the principal risk issues and make 
discussions with the executive team. 
• The SRC should advise the board on deciding risk appetite and risk 
tolerance levels. These decisions should account for the board’s risk 
aversion and prospective corporate strategy. 
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• The SRC should consider the macroeconomic environment when 
providing recommendations for risk appetite and risk tolerance levels. 
Also, the recommendations should be made after reviewing financial 
stability assessments by authoritative sources such as the Bank of 
England.  
• On making its recommendation or consultation with the board, the SRC 
should consider rigorous stress testing and scenario analysis under the 
assumption that the entity would fail, and fulfil the risk mitigation 
approach. 
• The overall risk management process should not be purely subjective but 
should also be based on some quantitative metrics to evaluate the 
performance objectively. The responsibility of an SRC is to review and 
approve such metrics.  
• The SRC in participation with the audit committee should establish 
parameters for performance evaluation of the overall risk management to 
ascertain that it is operating in a sufficiently precise and timely manner. 
 
ii. Independence of ERM Function and its Link with SRC: 
• An independent Chief Risk Officer (CRO) should participate in the risk 
management and risk oversight process and is ultimately accountable to 
the full board.  
• The treasurer is responsible for day-to-day risk management activities 
including liquidity and funding management. 
• With regard to internal reporting, the CRO should report to the SRC. 
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• In exercising ERM function, the CRO should work independently from 
the executive team and use the guidelines provided by the SRC on risk 
tolerance. However, the CRO can use veto power if required. 
• The CRO should update and align itself with respect to the board’s risk 
appetite. 
• The CRO should be adequately independent to be in position to give 
advice to the SRC on strategic proposals apart from the executive team. 
 
iii. Recruitment of an External Advisor: 
• The SRC should be provided with sufficient resources to hire a high 
quality external advisor which may deliver assistance in stress testing and 
scenario analysis of high impact events. 
• The board or the SRC should decide the source of external advice. 
However, the SRC should also consider if the best possible advice is 
available internally. 
 
iv. SRC Reporting: 
• The SRC should produce a separate report as a part of the annual report, 
focusing on the company’s risk management processes. 
• The disclosures must be consistent with IFRS 7,37 which provides 
guidance on both qualitative and quantitative disclosures. 
• The qualitative disclosures should cover information on the type of risks 
and the company’s risk management policies, procedures, and methods to 
                                                 
 
37 International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7 – Financial Instruments: Disclosures. For more 
information visit: http://eifrs.ifrs.org/eifrs/bnstandards/en/2016/ifrs07.pdf [Assessed 11th July 2016].   
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measure those risks. The quantitative disclosures should be focused on 
providing the summary of risk exposures. 
• The overall focus of an SRC should be on quality rather than on quantity 
or lengthening the risk reporting. The overlap of risk reporting should be 
avoided by considering a standardized reporting template. 
• The main focus of the SRC reporting should be on increasing the value 
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Appendix C 
ERM Examples 
No With a Board-level Risk 
Committee (including an ARC 
or SRC) 
Without a Board-level Risk Committee 
1 “Significant work has been carried 
out by management to close issues 
raised by Internal Audit and the 
Group’s risk policies and business 
standards have been mapped 
against the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission’s 
Enterprise Risk Management 
Framework (COSO framework) to 
provide a baseline position to 
assess where further development 
is required.” (AVIVA PLC, 2013 
Annual Report, p. 76). 
“Our Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
framework has been developed to be 
aligned with international standards 
(COSO and ISO31000) and it aids our 
compliance with the Financial Reporting 
Council’s (FRC) UK Corporate 
Governance Code guidance…” (Pearson 
PLC, 2015 Annual Report, p. 38).  
2 “Enterprise risk management will 
be embedded more tightly into 
operating business unit 
management. There will be a 
thorough annual review of the risk 
register as an integral part of the 
annual planning process.” (G4S 
PLC, 2015 Annual Report, p. 46). 
“The Group’s risk management process 
continues to follow the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) 
Enterprise Risk framework. The COSO 
framework provides a process to manage 
the risk of failure to achieve business 
objectives and assurance against material 
loss or mis-statement.” (Tate and Lyle, 
2014 Annual Report, p. 29). 
3 “We operate under a common 
framework through which risk 
management and control is 
embedded throughout the Group.” 
(RSA Insurance Group, 2012 
Annual Report, p. 26).  
“The Group places great importance on 
the identification and effective 
management of risks. Our approach to 
enterprise risk management helps us to 
deliver our objectives and maximise the 
returns of the Group.” (Rolls-Royce 
Holdings PLC, 2013 Annual Report, p. 
32). 
4 “We continue to work on the 
development of our Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM) 
framework.” (Rexam PLC, 2014 
Annual Report, p. 32). 
“We continue to use our established 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
process across the group to assess and 
manage our most significant risks. We 
analyse both the possible causes of a risk 
and what the impact would be if the risk 
occurred.” (Severn Trent PLC, 2013 
Annual Report, p. 39). 
5 “The diagram below sets out 
Petrofac’s Enterprise Risk 
“Throughout 2015, Essentra further 
embedded its enterprise risk management 
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Management Framework, which 
encompasses the policies, culture, 
processes, systems and other 
aspects of the Company that taken 
together facilitate its effective and 
efficient operation.” (Petrofac 
Limited, 2013 Annual Report, p. 
88).  
framework, which includes both 
Operational and Executive Risk 
Management Committees meeting on a 
quarterly basis, to discuss and monitor the 
changing risk environment to which 
Essentra is exposed and ensure any 
necessary mitigating actions are 
undertaken.” (Essentra PLC, 2015 Annual 
Report, p. 30). 
 
